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IV. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(f). The Utah Court of 
Appeals now has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-4-103(2)(e). 
V. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Ramon Juma, having entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of 
tvf 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a 3 degree felony, and having 
reserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial on his motion to suppress 
evidence (Record at 65-75), asserts the following issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that there was 
reasonable articulable suspicion to support the stop and 
detention of Juma. (Record, 22-43, 65-75, 107) 
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Standard of Review: Mr. Juma argues that the trial court erred by 
denying his Motion to Suppress. On review of both criminal and civil 
proceedings, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 
1172 (Utah 1988); see also, State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, % 22, 135 P.3d 864 
(defining a factual finding). "We review the trial court's ruling on a motion 
to suppress for correctness, without deference to the trial court's application 
of the law to the facts." Layton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244,f11, 139 
P.3d 281 (citing State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, \ 15, 103 P.3d 699). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the detention of 
Juma was Not Excessive or Beyond the Scope of the Original 
Stop. (Record, 22-43, 65-75, 107). 
Standard of Review: Mr. Juma argues that the trial court erred by 
denying his Motion to Suppress. On review of both criminal and civil 
proceedings, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 
1172 (Utah 1988); see also, State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26,122, 135 P.3d 864 
(defining a factual finding). "We review the trial court's ruling on a motion 
to suppress for correctness, without deference to the trial court's application 
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of the law to the facts." Layton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, f 11, 139 
P.3d 281 (citing State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103P.3d699). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress 
under circumstances where any basis in fact for reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity had dissipated. 
(Record, 22-43, 65-75, 107). 
Standard of Review: Mr. Juma argues that the trial court erred by 
denying his Motion to Suppress. On review of both criminal and civil 
proceedings, the appellate court accepts the trial courts findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 
1172 (Utah 1988); see also, State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, f 22, 135 P.3d 864 
(defining a factual finding). MWe review the trial court's ruling on a motion 
to suppress for correctness, without deference to the trial court's application 
of the law to the facts." Layton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, f 11, 139 
P.3d 281 (citing State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.3d 699). 
4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying the 
Motion to Suppress Evidence where Trooper Bowles conducted 
a search of the interior of the vehicle and the closed containers 
therein, absent exigent circumstances, without first seeking and 
obtaining a search warrant, based on Probable Cause, in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
violation of both the Fourth Amendment and Article I Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. (Record, 22-43, 65-75, 107). 
Standard of Review: Mr. Juma argues that the trial court erred by 
denying his Motion to Suppress. On review of both criminal and civil 
proceedings, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 
1172 (Utah 1988); see also, State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26,122, 135 P.3d 864 
(defining a factual finding). "We review the trial court's ruling on a motion 
to suppress for correctness, without deference to the trial court's application 
of the law to the facts." Layton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244,1f 11, 139 
P.3d 281 (citing State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,115, 103 P.3d 699). 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 14 
STATUTES: 
UCA § 41-6a-904 
UCA § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) 
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UCA § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
UCA §77-7-15 
UCA § 78A-3-102(3)(f) 
UCA §78A-4-103(2)G). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
VIL 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Memorandum Decision and final Order of 
the Sixth Judicial District Court for the State of Utah, Sevier County, 
Richfield Department, the Hon. Wallace A. Lee, Judge, denying Defendant 
Ramon Juma's Motion to Suppress Evidence. (Record, 65-75). 
Juma had sought the exclusion of all evidence for reason that the 
seizure of his person and vehicle, detention, and subsequent search and 
arrest were unlawful, and violated his Constitutional rights under both the 
Fourth Amendment and under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Juma argued that the motor vehicle stop by police was without any 
reasonable articulable suspicion of any violation of traffic, equipment or 
other laws; that his detention by police after the stop exceeded the scope of 
the original stop; that any reasonable suspicion dissipated upon the police 
issuing a warning citation to the driver of the vehicle; and that the additional 
detention by police to conduct a drug dog sniff of the vehicle did not 
establish sufficient probable cause to permit the police to search the vehicle 
without first obtaining a search warrant, arguing that no exigent 
circumstances existed to justify the warrantless search. 
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B. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL 
COURT 
Defendant/Appellant Ramon Juma was arrested on March 31, 2009 in 
Sevier County, Utah and charged by Information with one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, to wit: more than one pound but less 
than 100 pounds of marijuana, with intent to distribute, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(a)(iii), and one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, cocaine, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), on 
April 3, 2009. 
Upon bind over after conducting a Preliminary Hearing on August 11, 
2009, Juma Moved to Suppress the Evidence against him. A Suppression 
Evidentiary Hearing was held on September 22, 2009, and the issues were 
briefed by all parties. The trial court denied Juma's Motion to Suppress in 
its Memorandum Decision dated March 4, 2010. 
After the trial court denied the Motion to Suppress Evidence, Juma 
entered a Conditional Guilty Plea on June 15, 2010, to the single count of 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, reserving his right to 
appeal the trial court's denial of the Motion to Suppress; the remaining count 
of possession of cocaine was dismissed. Juma waived time for sentencing, 
was sentenced to 0 - 5 years at the Utah State Prison; however, the sentence 
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was stayed by the trial court while Juma appeals the denial of his 
suppression Motion, and he remains free on an appeal bond and other 
conditions imposed by the trial court. 
Juma timely filed his Notice of Appeal on June 15, 2010 with the 
District Court in Richfield. 
C. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 31, 2009, at about 9:30 a.m., Trooper Nick Bowles of 
the Utah Highway Patrol was conducting traffic patrol along 
Interstate 70 in Sevier County, when he observed a black 
Chevrolet sedan enter the freeway behind a semi-trailer, both going 
eastbound. Both the semi and the Chevy remained in the right 
(outside) lane as they passed several Utah Department of 
Transportation (UDOT) maintenance vehicles along the outside 
shoulder, which were not in or obstructing any lanes of traffic. 
(Record at 66; Record at 106, Preliminary Hearing Transcript, pp. 
13-16; Record at 107, Suppression Hearing Transcript, pp. 14, 37). 
2. Alhough the adjacent left lane on the freeway was unoccupied, 
neither the semi, nor the Chevy, moved over or changed lanes as 
each approached and then passed the UDOT vehicles. (Record at 
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66; Record 106, Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p. 18; Record at 
107, Suppression Hearing Transcript, p. 14). 
3. The UDOT vehicles were displaying flashing "amber" or 
commonly known as yellow lights; none of the stopped vehicles 
displayed any lighted or flashing red, white or blue lights, alone or 
in any combination. (Record at 106, pp. 16-18; Record at 107, p. 
12). 
4. When Trooper Bowles observed the semi and the black Chevy 
both pass the UDOT crew without changing lanes, he decided to 
stop the black Chevy with out-of-state license plates. Trooper 
Bowies' patrol car was equipped with video/audio recording 
devices, and a copy of the dash-cam video was admitted as 
evidence at the time of the Suppression Hearing, September 22, 
2009. (Record at 106, p. 18-19; Record at 107, pp. 30-31). 
5. Trooper Bowles testified at both the Preliminary Hearing and the 
Suppression Hearing that the only reason he stopped the black 
Chevy was for failing to change lanes into the unoccupied left lane, 
as the vehicle approached and passed the UDOT crew. (Record at 
106, p. 5; Record at 107, p. 11). 
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6. Bowles testified that he "felt it was dangerous to the safety of the 
UDOT workers for the black Chevrolet not to move over as it 
passed." (Record at 67; Record at 106, p. 5; Record at 107, p. 15). 
7. The driver of the Chevy, Diamond Flynn, produced a Michigan ID 
card, but admitted she had no current driver's license; the 
passenger, Defendant Ramon Juma, produced his Kansas driver's 
license and his vehicle contract rental agreement. (Record at 68; 
Record at 106, pp. 6-7; Record at 107, p. 18). 
8. Trooper Bowles required the driver, Flynn, to sit with him in his 
patrol cruiser, while he ran standard background checks on both 
Flynn and Juma. During the course of the next 18 minutes, 
Trooper Bowles received information verifying that neither Flynn 
nor Juma have any outstanding warrants, that their identification 
and license information is all correct, and that the rental vehicle 
information is all correct. He also received dispatch information 
that Juma had prior arrests in other states in the past several years 
for DUI and for drug possession; however, Juma had only been 
convicted of a DUI and all other charges had been dismissed prior 
to this Utah investigation. (Record at 106, p. 22; Record at 107, 
pp. 53-54). 
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Trooper Bowles then gave Flynn a written warning notice for 
driving without a license, gave her back her ID card, and she began 
exiting the patrol car to leave; at that point, Trooper Bowles asked 
her if he could ask more questions, and then he asked to search the 
vehicle. (Record at 68; Record at 106, pp. 26-29; Record at 107, 
pp. 56-57). 
Flynn refused this request and advised that Juma was the car's 
actual renter. Bowles then asked Juma if he could search, and Juma 
also declined. (Record at 68; Record at 106, pp. 28-29; Record at 
107, p. 57). 
At this point in time, Bowles decided to deploy his canine, which 
had been with him in the patrol car the entire time. Both Flynn and 
Juma were outside the vehicle, along side the shoulder of the 
freeway, and could not hide, destroy, or otherwise interfere with 
any of the potential evidence in the car. (Record at 106, pp. 9-10; 
Record at 107, p. 57). 
Based on the dog's actions while sniffing the car, Trooper Bowles 
declared that the dog had alerted and he immediately began 
searching the interior of the black Chevy, where he subsequently 
discovered about 33 pounds of marijuana inside one or more 
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closed containers. When Juma was arrested and transported to jail, 
a tiny amount of cocaine was discovered in his pocket. (Record at 
106, p. 10-11). 
13. Juma was charged by Information with Count I, Possession of 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute (marijuana) and 
Count II, Possession of Controlled Substance (cocaine), both Third 
Degree Felonies. (Record at 3). 
14. Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum to Suppress 
Evidence on August 11, 2009 (Record at 22-36), and a 
Supplemental Memorandum on September 22, 2009 (Record at 37-
43). The Court held an Evidentiary Hearing in the matter on 
September 22, 2009 (Record at 106), the State filed its 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Suppress on 
November 17, 2009 (Record at 47-62), and the District Court 
issued its Memorandum Decision denying Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress, on March 4, 2010 (Record at 65-75). 
15. On June 15, 2010, Defendant Juma entered into a Conditional 
guilty plea for Count I, reserving the right to appeal, and upon the 
State's motion, Count II was dismissed. (Record at 85-86). 
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16. Juma timely filed his Notice of Appeal at the District Court in 
Richfield on June 15, 2010 (Record at 89-90); The District Court 
granted Juma's Motion for Stay of Sentence Pending Appeal, and 
Juma remains free on an appeal bond and other restrictions 
imposed by the District Court (Record at 91-92). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erred as a matter of law, in not granting the 
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence in this case, where under the 
totality of the circumstances and facts, the law requires exclusion of 
evidence where, 
I. the police lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to 
stop the defendant's car and detain him and his driver; 
II. the duration of the stop was excessive, and beyond the 
scope of the original stop; 
III. any reasonable articulable suspicion had dissipated; 
and where 
IV. the police used a dog sniff alert to claim probable 
cause to search the car, then searched the car without 
obtaining a search warrant, under conditions that did 
not amount to exigent circumstances. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN 
IT DENIED MR. JUMA'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ON 
GROUNDS OF THE LACK OF REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
STOP AND DETAIN DEFENDANT; ON GROUNDS OF EXCESSIVE 
DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT; ON GROUNDS OF THE 
DISSAPATION OF ANY REASONABLE SUSPICION; ON 
GROUNDS OF VIOLATING JUMA'S DUE PROCESS AND OTHER 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE; ON GROUNDS OF LACK OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE WITHOUT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES; ON GROUNDS 
OF UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT A 
WARRANT. 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT 
RULED THAT TROOPER BOWLES HAD REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO STOP AND DETAIN THE VEHICLE 
A. Marshaling of Facts: 
In its Memorandum Decision denying Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence, the Trial court found that Trooper Bowles "stopped 
the vehicle in which Mr. Juma was a passenger, because the driver failed 
to move over for an emergency vehicle." Another finding was that 
"Trooper Bowles felt it was dangerous to the safety of the UDOT 
workers for the black Chevrolet not to move over as it passed." Further, 
in its analysis, the Trial Court concluded that Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-
n 
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904 did not define the UDOT vehicles as "authorized emergency 
vehicles" and that "the Court finds Trooper Bowles made a good faith 
mistake" in that he erroneously believed that the law required drivers to 
move over to the adjacent, unoccupied travel lane when passing 
emergency vehicles, without distinguishing the differences further 
described in §41-6a-904(3), that the UDOT vehicles were not emergency 
vehicles, and that the legal requirement for drivers passing such vehicles 
does not include making a lane change where one is safely available. 
B. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Ruling that Trooper Bowles 
had Reasonable Articulable Suspicion to Stop and Detain the Vehicle 
Under Circumstances Where Bowles Mistakenly Believed that Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6a-904 Requires Vehicles to Move to an Adjacent, 
Unoccupied Lane of Travel While Passing UDOT Maintenance Vehicles 
Displaying Flashing Amber (Yellow) Lights. 
In gauging the legality of the stop of a motor vehicle, the officer's 
"actual" motivation is not relevant; what counts is whether the driver, from a 
purely objective point of view, was violating a motor vehicle law, or 
behaving in such a manner as to give rise to reasonable suspicion of other 
criminal activity. Wren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); United States 
v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Nunez, 455 F.3d 
1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006). The notion of a "pretextual" stop is a non 
sequitur. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) 
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{en banc). See also, Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15. Either there was a motor 
vehicle offense, or there was not. What motivated the officer is not relevant. 
The trial court below drew its analysis from State v. Applegate, 194 
P.3d 925 (Utah 2008) and State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d 7 (Ut App 1999), ruling 
that "all that matters is that [the officer is] able to point to specific and 
articulable facts regarding [a suspect's] conduct which, taken together with 
rational inferences, created a reasonable suspicion of a violation of traffic 
laws." (quoting Applegate, supra, at 931). The trial court determined that 
although Trooper Bowles "obviously made a mistake about the specific 
traffic law involved, he still had a reasonable articulable suspicion 
Defendants had committed a traffic violation." 
Since there was no evidence the trooper had stopped the car for a 
contrived or improper purpose, the trial court concludes that his mistaken 
understanding of what is and is not a violation of the traffic code doesn't 
matter. The trial court concluded that because Trooper Bowles believed that 
this failure to move over, despite no legal reason to do so, constituted a 
potential safety hazard to the UDOT workers, this subjective belief gave him 
reasonable suspicion to stop, detain and seize the vehicle and its occupants. 
The trial court's own findings of fact and analysis that Trooper 
Bowles mistakenly believed that the UDOT vehicles were emergency 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vehicles under the statute, and that drivers are required to move over to the 
adjacent unoccupied lane, confirm that Trooper Bowies' mistake was one of 
law, not fact 
A mistake of law is never objectively reasonable. See, United States 
v. DeGasso, 69 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2004); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 
(Utah App. 1999); State v. Friesen, supra; United States v. Herrera, 444 
F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Valadez-Valadez, 525 F.3d (10th 
Cir. 2008). 
But by the trial court's analysis, the police can make an observation of 
someone, erroneously believe that what they are observing is a violation, and 
make a Level II stop when even a cursory reading of the statute allegedly 
violated would show that the behavior observed is not in violation of the 
law. This is a misreading of the rulings in Applegate and Fries en, supra. 
In Applegate the Utah Supreme Court found that the arresting officer 
was mistaken in his understanding of some aspects of the traffic code, but 
was correct on one, namely, that "[h]e relied on his belief that residents of 
Utah who purchase vehicles must register those vehicles in Utah . . . within 
60 days of establishing residence here." (Citation omitted). The arresting 
officer was mistaken on the application of other sections of the law, but was 
spot-on in relying upon one part of the law supported by his factual 
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observations. This distinguishes Applegate from the instant case, where 
Trooper Bowles was plainly wrong about the emergency vehicle section of 
the law, and no other violation of law was observed that would redeem the 
stop. 
In Friesen, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that stopping a 
vehicle for lacking a front license plate, where the police knew that not all 
states require a front plate, and where the officer had no actual knowledge of 
whether Wyoming required a front plate, and was unclear about the front 
plate requirement, lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of any criminal 
activity or traffic or equipment violation of the law. The court stated, "if the 
conduct of the suspected person is clearly known and the officer's 
uncertainty - his suspicion - regards the prohibitions of the law, the officer 
has no basis upon which to make or defend the stop." 998 P.2d at 14. 
The Courts have narrowly limited situations where an officer's good 
faith mistake of law carves out an exception to the exclusionary rule. The 
Utah Supreme Court describes these limited situations in State v. Baker, 
2010 UT 18 (2010), stating, "[A] good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule exists when an officer acts in reasonable reliance on a warrant, United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 at 920 (1984), in reasonable reliance on a 
statute later declared unconstitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349 
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(1984), or in "objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently recalled 
warrant.99 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. at 703." Baker at fS5.-. 
However, the Fourth Amendment analysis in Baker stops short of 
finding that the same exception exists under the Utah Constitution {Baker, fn 
2). "[0]ur state's Declaration of Rights might change the result and impose 
different demands on police officers and others who in a very real sense are 
the everyday guardians of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." Id. The applicable language is found in Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
This Defendant asserts his rights against unreasonable search and seizure 
under both the provisions of the Fourth Amendment, and the Utah 
Constitution. The question of whether reasonable suspicion exists should be 
based upon the facts known to the police officer at the time of the arrest. 
Reasonable, articulable suspicion must be supported by what the law 
actually is, not what the officer subjectively thought the law was. Applegate, 
at Tfl4. • 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SUPPRESSING ALL 
EVIDENCE SEIZED WHERE TROOPER BOWLES DETAINED 
THE DEFENDANT MUCH LONGER THAN NECESSARY TO 
EFFECT THE PURPOSE OF THE STOP. 
A. Marshaling of Facts. 
The trial court's findings of fact that support its decision to deny the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence include the observations made 
by Trooper Bowles after stopping and detaining Defendant. These 
include details of a large amount of travel luggage for two people, 
unusual nervousness of the occupants, the fact of the vehicle having been 
rented in Nebraska while the driver was from Michigan and Juma was 
from Kansas, the discrepancies between the two occupants' versions of 
where they had traveled, and the dispatch report that Juma had prior 
drug-related arrests (but no convictions). Facts supporting suppression 
include that Trooper Bowles gave Flynn a written warning for driving 
without a current valid license, and returned her paperwork, and then 
initiated new questioning as she began to leave his patrol car, and that 
Bowles sought consent to search the vehicle and was rebuffed before 
deploying his canine for a drug sniff. 
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B. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that the Detention of Juma and 
Flynn was Not Excessive or Beyond the Scope of the Original Stop. 
The Utah Courts in both Baker and Applegate, supra, applied a two-
step test to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. Applegate at \ 9. "The first step is to determine whether 'the 
police officer's action [was] justified at its inception'. In the second step, we 
must determine whether the detention following the stop was 'reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place.'" Id. (as cited in Baker, \ 12, quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 
1131-32). Juma has already asserted that the stop was not justified. 
Police conduct that constitutes an illegal detention beyond the scope 
of the purpose of an ordinary traffic stop includes when police ask questions 
about whether a vehicle's occupants possess drugs. "Subsequent or 
concurrent detentions for questioning [about drugs] are justified only when 
the officer has "reasonable suspicion" of illegal transactions in drugs or of 
th 
any other serious crime. " United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (1(T Cir. 
1995) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498-99). 
In this case, Trooper Bowles detained Juma and Flynn for about 18 
minutes while he simultaneously requested information and awaited 
responses from his dispatch, and interrogated Flynn in the patrol car. The 
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the car's rental status, wants and warrants check and a background check can 
vary under different conditions, and in this case, it took about 18 minutes. 
Because Flynn was driving without a current, valid driver's license, Bowles 
had reasonable suspicion of that violation, and any increase in the length of 
the detention to obtain that basic background check is not the issue. 
However, once Bowles gave Flynn a written warning citation and the 
rest of her paperwork, and she started to leave his vehicle, Bowles had 
concluded the purpose for the stop, and should have allowed them to leave. 
State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). 
Further, during that wait, Bowles chose to not deploy his canine to 
sniff the subject vehicle. Bowles had concluded the stop and released the 
driver before initiating a new line of questioning and requesting permission 
to search the vehicle. Only after letting Flynn go with a warning and being 
rebuffed in his request to search the vehicle, did Bowles then order Flynn 
and Juma to stand aside while he deployed his dog to sniff the exterior of 
their vehicle. In People v. Brandon, 140 P. 3d 15, 19 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) 
the suppression of evidence was upheld for a dog search that occurred after 
the purpose of the stop had concluded even though the dog was in the patrol 
vehicle throughout the lawful duration of the stop. 
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Under similar circumstances in State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18 at 114, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that "the purpose of the stop concluded when the 
officers finished processing the arrest [of the driver]. "We then hold that the 
drug dog sniff that occurred after the purposes of the stop had been 
completed violated Mr. Baker's Fourth Amendment rights." Id. 
The police in Baker detained the passengers, including Baker, after 
they had completed the arrest of the driver of their car, for the purpose of 
waiting for a K-9 unit with a drug sniffing dog to arrive at the scene. After 
arresting the driver for driving on a suspended license, the officers had no 
further need to control the scene, so the Court assessed whether additional 
detention of the passengers was lawful, since "even a small amount of 
intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an initially lawful search is 
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment." Id at f 28 (quoting State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P. 2d at 1135 (Utah 1989)). 
Under the Fourth Amendment, it is well-settled that a dog sniff is not 
a search, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983), and that a drug-
trained dog may walk the perimeter of a lawfully detained vehicle even if 
police have no reasonable suspicion that the vehicle occupants are engaged 
in drug-related activity so long as the dog sniff search does not extend the 
duration of the stop. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Prolonging a seizure can become unlawful "if it is prolonged beyond the 
time reasonably required to complete that mission." Id. at 407. 
An officer cannot prolong a driver's detention after concluding the 
purpose of the original stop without reasonable belief that the driver was 
involved in other illegal activity. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 25, f 32. In 
Hansen, the driver was detained for an illegal lane change and lack of car 
insurance. The officer returned his license and registration and gave him a 
verbal warning to get insurance, then the officer inquired if there were drugs 
and alcohol in the car and asked for consent to search, which was given. 
The Court held that the driver's consent was "the fruit of an illegal detention 
because the officer continued to question him after the purpose of the stop 
had concluded." Id. At f 32. 
Detaining the occupants of a car beyond the lawful purpose of the stop 
to conduct a dog sniff does not differ "in any meaningful way from detaining 
occupants in order to request consent to search their car. Both a dog sniff 
and a consent search are legal under the Fourth Amendment only when they 
are performed during the course of a lawful stop." State v. Baker, 2010 UT 
18 at 1f 33. 
Trooper Bowles exceeded the scope of detention when he requested 
permission to search the car. See, State v. Bissegger, 76 P.3d 178 (Utah 
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App. 2003) (citing State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 432, 437 (Utah App. 1990) 
(finding a Fourth Amendment violation where police did not have the 
"reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify their 
continued detention and questioning of the [defendants] once . . . the purpose 
for the initial stop had been accomplished."). 
POINT III, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
DISSIPATION OF REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION 
WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE TERMINATION OF FURTHER 
DETENTION AND THEREBY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
A. Marshaling of Facts. 
The trial court does not directly address the notion of 
"Dissipation of Reasonable Suspicion" in its Decision; 
however, the State does argue that no such doctrine exists, and 
that the observations of Trooper Bowles created sufficient 
reasonable articulable suspicion of drug trafficking to justify 
further detention, dog deployment and the search. 
B. The trial court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress under 
circumstances where any basis in fact for reasonable articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity had dissipated. 
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In State v. Morris, 2009 UT App. 181, the court held that a traffic stop 
must terminate and the driver and occupants must be immediately permitted 
to leave, when the officer's reasonable articulable suspicion dissipates. In 
Morris, the officer stopped a vehicle when he could not see a rear license 
plate. Upon exiting his patrol car and approaching the vehicle on foot, the 
officer observed a valid, current temporary paper license mounted in the rear 
window of the car. Instead of continuing the stop, seeking license, 
registration, insurance and background information, the officer should have 
simply turned around and left, as he no longer had any reasonable suspicion 
to detain this driver. 
Police detention is no longer justified after reasonable suspicion 
dissipates. Once the reason for the traffic stop has been resolved, "any 
further temporary detention . . . constitutes an illegal seizure." State v. 
Hansen, 63 P. 3d 650 at \ 31. 
When Trooper Bowles gave Flynn a warning citation, returned her ID 
card and other paperwork and she opened the door of his patrol car and 
started leave, Bowles detained her and Juma further to inquire about drugs 
and request a consent search. If Bowles had some new or heightened 
suspicion regarding luggage, rental car contracts, etc., he would not have 
released Flynn. Trooper Bowles own actions in concluding the purpose of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the stop would indicate that any reasonable articulable suspicion had 
dissipated, and there was no further compelling reason to detain Flynn and 
Juma. 
Once the police have issued a traffic citation for a minor violation, the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from searching the vehicle as though 
it were incident to an arrest. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). In 
Knowles, the police stopped the driver for speeding, issued him a written 
citation, and then proceeded to search the interior of his vehicle, finding 
drug contraband. In it's ruling, the Supreme Court stated: 
Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, 
all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been 
obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to 
be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger 
compartment of the car. Id. 
POINT IV, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM A 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH WITHOUT SUFFICIENT PROBABLE 
CAUSE AND WITHOUT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. 
A. Marshaling of Facts. 
The trial court found nothing wrong with Trooper Bowles 
further detention of the vehicle's occupants in order to deploy 
his trained service animal to conduct a drug sniff, and upon 
receiving an indication from the dog, conducting an immediate 
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search of the interior of the vehicle and the closed containers 
within the vehicle, without first obtaining a search warrant 
B. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Denying the 
Motion to Suppress Evidence Where Trooper Bowles 
Conducted a Search of the Interior of the Vehicle and the 
Closed Containers Therein, Absent Exigent Circumstances, 
Without First Seeking and Obtaining a Search Warrant, Based 
on Probable Cause, in Violation of Both the Fourth Amendment 
and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 
I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, protect citizens from unreasonable 
searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers, and effects by the 
government. The Fourth Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
"The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, which is 
measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." 
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 
U.S. 248,250 (1991)). Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment 
"depends 'on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right 
to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers."' State 
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v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,131 78 P. 3d 590 (quoting United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, All U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). 
Fourth Amendment analyses should always begin with the basic rule 
that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval 
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) 
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Among these 
exceptions would be where a suspect might gain possession of a weapon or 
destroy evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.752 at 763. 
Utah's Constitution provides greater protection from unreasonable 
search and seizure than does the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. See, State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-8 (Utah 1990); State 
v. Gardner, 814 P. 2d 568, 571 (Utah 1991). 
With all the occupants out of the car, off the side of the road, unable 
to hide or destroy anything, during daylight hours on a weekday, there were 
no exigent circumstances that would demand an immediate search of the 
vehicle without first obtaining a warrant from a magistrate, based on an 
affidavit of the officer articulating the details giving rise to probable cause. 
In these modem times, electronic means such as telephone and email are 
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routinely used to obtain warrants, and it's not like Flynn and Juma were 
going to run off on foot along the 1-70 freeway near Salina! 
Bowles lacked any exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless 
search, such as preventing the imminent destruction of evidence. State v. 
Duran, 2007 UT 23 f 7 , 156 P.3d 795. It was not the middle of the night, it 
wasn't even raining, nor were there other reasons that would have made it 
difficult to obtain a warrant without much delay. See, State v. Rodriguez, 
2007 UT 15,1fi[43-44, 156 P. 3d 771. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress Evidence. The mistake of law by Trooper Bowles in 
stopping and detaining Defendant is insurmountable by any degree of "good 
faith" he may have had in his erroneous understanding of the traffic code, 
namely, the definition of "emergency vehicles" and the duties of motorists 
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-904. Since the stop was not valid, no amount 
of subsequently observed facts matter, and the evidence should be excluded. 
The new suspicions raised by Bowles observations regarding luggage, 
car rental and residency details, and so forth, are insufficient to justify 
detaining Juma further. Once Bowles gave Flynn, the driver, a warning 
citation and her other paperwork, the stop was over, and further detention of 
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Flynn and Juma was unlawful. With the act of completing his investigation 
and issuing a warning citation, Bowles conceded that his potentially 
reasonable articulable suspicions of drug trafficking had dissipated, and 
further detention of the vehicle occupants was unjustified. By further 
detaining the occupants to conduct a drug sniff by his dog, Bowles violated 
Juma's rights under both the Fourth Amendment and the Utah Constitution. 
In conducting a warrantless search of the vehicle absent exigent 
circumstances, Bowles infringed upon Juma's rights under both the Fourth 
Amendment and the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant/Appellant Ramon Juma requests this 
Court to Overrule the Decision of the trial court below denying his Motion 
to Suppress Evidence. 
SUBMITTED this $f) day of October, 2010. 
Edwara D. Flint 
Attorney for Ramon Juma 
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The undersigned, Dale P. Eyre, Sevier County Attorney, 
states on information and belief that the Defendant committed the 
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TO DISTRIBUTE, contrary to Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iii), Utah Code 
Annotated, in that said Defendant did, on or about the 31st day of 
March, 20 09, at the County of Sevier, State of Utah, knowingly and 
intentionally possess with intent to distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, to-wit: marijuana, the same constituting a 
Felony of the Third Degree, 
COUNT 2: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, contrary to 
Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, in that said Defendant / CZ> 
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Page 2—Information 
State of Uah vs. Ramon A. Juma 
> 
did, on or about March 31, 2 009, at the County of Sevier, State of 
Utah, knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled 
substance, to-wit: cocaine, all of which constitutes a Felony of the 
Third Degree. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: Nick Bowles 
Authorized for presentment and filing 
on the /^ day of April, 2009. 
DALE P. EYRE 
Sevier County Attorney 
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Edward D.Flint 4573 
Jonathon W. Grimes 10462 
ACCESS LEGAL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
455 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-363-5297 
Facsimile: 801-532-2063 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SEVIER COUNTY, RICHFIELD DEPARTMENT 





DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
> 
Case No.: 091600075 
Judge Wallace A. Lee 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Ramon A. Juma, through counsel of record, Edward D. 
Flint, and Respectfully MOVES this Court to Order the Suppression of certain evidence and 
testimony in this case, for reason that the State has violated the Defendant's Constitutional rights 
in obtaining same. This Motion is further supported by the accompanying Memorandum. 
DATED this /() day of August, 2009. 
EdwaraT). Flint 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
//A. 
I certify that on the^HT day ^ August, 2009,1 personally mailed/hand-delivered/faxed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence; and 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence to the following: 
Sevier County Attorney 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 
Richfield, UT 84701 
Edward D. Flint 
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Edward D.Flint 4573 
Jonathon W. Grimes 10462 
ACCESS LEGAL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
455 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-363-5297 
Facsimile: 801-532-2063 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SEVIER COUNTY, RICHFIELD DEPARTMENT 





MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Case No.: 091600075 
Judge Wallace A. Lee 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Ramon A. Juma, through counsel of record, Edward D. 
Flint, and Respectfully Submits the following Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress Evidence. 
INTRODUCTION AND DISCLAIMER 
Defendant Juma's counsel, Edward D. Flint, submits this Motion and Memorandum at 
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supplement the contents hereof, should the sworn testimony at the Preliminary Hearing differ 
from the representations herein. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On March 31,2009, Defendant Ramon A. Juma (Juma) was riding in the front 
passenger seat of a black, four-door Chevrolet sedan that he had rented several days 
earlier. 
2. The vehicle was driven by Juma's traveling companion, Diamond Flynn. 
3. Trooper Nick Bowles of the Utah Highway Patrol reports that he was in his patrol 
vehicle, stationary in the median of Interstate 70 near milepost 57 and observed the 
black Chevy in the eastbound, outside lane (right lane), as it passed by several Utah 
Dept. of Transportation vehicles on the eastbound shoulder, with their emergency 
lights flashing. 
4. Trooper Bowles states that the Chevy did not change lanes to the unoccupied left lane 
as it neared and passed the UDOT vehicles, and that is why he proceeded to stop the 
vehicle. 
5. Upon detaining Flynn and Juma, Trooper Bowles discovered that Flynn did not 
possess a valid driver's license. 
6. Trooper Bowles ordered both occupants out of the vehicle, took the picture ID's of 
both, and placed Juma along the passenger side of the car, and ordered him to remain 
there while he spoke with Flynn in the patrol car. 
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Trooper Bowles immediately advised Flynn that he was going to issue her a warning 
citation for the driving violation. 
Trooper Bowles interrogated Flynn in the patrol car and radioed to his dispatch for 
information on both Flynn and Juma, and briefly spoke with Juma outside of the 
patrol vehicle, for approximately 18 minutes before finally issuing a "warning" 
citation to Flynn and telling her she could leave. 
Flynn exited the patrol vehicle and started back towards the rented Chevy. Trooper 
Bowles then asked Flynn if she would wait a moment, "if we could talk some more." 
Bowles then asked her if there were any illegal narcotics in the vehicle, Flynn 
responded that there were none; Bowles then asked if she would consent to a search 
of the vehicle. Flynn declined and stated that it was Juiiia's vehicle. 
Trooper Bowles then asked Juma if there were any illegal narcotics in the vehicle, 
and Juma replied that there were none; Bowles asked Juma if he could search the 
vehicle, and Juma refused to grant any such permission. 
Trooper Bowles then deployed a canine which ultimately resulted in Bowles 
searching the defendant's vehicle, where marijuana was discovered, and both Juma 
and Flynn were arrested. Upon a search of Juma, a small amount of cocaine was 
found in his clothing. 
Juma is now before this Court charged by Information with a Third Degree Felony for 
the Possession of cocaine, a Third Degree Felony for Possession of marijuana with ^ 
CJ 
intent to distribute. O 
O 
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ARGUMENT I. 
TROOPER BOWLES LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TO STOP THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE 
The statement of Trooper Bowles that the sole reason for stopping the Chevrolet driven 
by Flynn, where Juma was a passenger, was and is, that the vehicle failed to move over and 
change lanes while approaching and passing the UDOT crew on the right shoulder of eastbound 
1-70. He specifically states that the UDOT vehicles had their yellow (amber) lights flashing, and 
that the left travel lane was unoccupied, and that Flynn could have moved into the left lane 
before passing the UDOT vehicles. 
Defendant submits that there is no legal requirement for the driver of a vehicle to move 
over, move to the left or change lanes while approaching or passing a highway maintenance 
vehicle with its yellow (amber) lights flashing. A driver is only required to slow down and 
provide as much space as practical to the stationary highway maintenance vehicle. The law in 
Utah is: 
41-6a-904. Approaching emergency vehicle - Necessary signals -
Stationary emergency vehicle — Duties of respective operators. 
(1) Except when otherwise directed by a peace officer, the operator of a 
vehicle, upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle using 
audible or visual signals under Section 41-6a-212 or 41-6a-1625, shall: 
(a) yield the right-of-way and immediately move to a position parallel to, and 
as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, clear of any 
intersection; and 
(b) then stop and remain stopped until the authorized emergency vehicle has 
passed. 
(2) The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary authorized 
emergency vehicle that is displaying alternately flashing red, red and white, or red 
and blue lights, shall: C\| 
(a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; O 
CD 
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(b) provide as much space as practical to the stationary authorized emergency 
vehicle; and 
(c) if traveling in a lane adjacent to the stationary authorized emergency 
vehicle and if practical, with due regard to safety and traffic conditions, make a 
lane change into a lane not adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle. 
(3) The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary tow truck or 
highway maintenance vehicle that is displaying flashing amber lights, shall: 
(a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; and 
(b) provide as much space as practical to the stationary tow truck or highway 
maintenance vehicle. 
(4) This section does not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency 
vehicle, tow truck, or highway maintenance vehicle from the duty to drive with 
regard for the safety of all persons using the highway. 
Trooper Bowles should not have stopped the Chevy sedan driven by Flynn. She would only 
have been required to move over, move left or change lanes if an official emergency vehicle was 
stopped, flashing red, red and white or red and blue lights, as required in section (2) of the 
statute. 
The UDOT vehicles with their flashing yellow (amber) lights are governed by section (3) 
of the statute. The UDOT vehicles were completely off of the highway, on the shoulder, and not 
impeding traffic. Ms. Flynn did nothing wrong, and Trooper Bowles had no reasonable 
articulable suspicion of an actual violation of the law that would permit him to stop the Chevy 
sedan. 
Protection from unreasonable search and seizure is guaranteed under the United States 
Constitution, Amendment Four, and the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14, which gives 
even broader protection. State v. Larocco. 794 P2d 460, 465-8 (Utah 1990); State v. Gardner. 
814P.2d568,571 (Utah 1991). 
11 
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Officer Baldwin stopped and detained Defendant without any reasonably articulated 
suspicion that she had committed any violation, and thereby detained her unlawfully. State v. 
Deitman, 739 P2d 616,618 (Utah 1987); See, also Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1990). 
Since the stop and detention of defendant was illegal from its inception, any evidence or 
information obtained subsequent to the stop is inadmissible under the "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" doctrine, and must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States. 371 US 471,487-88 (1963). 
ARGUMENT IL 
TROOPER BOWLES DETAINED FLYNN AND JUMA 
MUCH LONGER THAN NECESSARY TO EFFECT 
THE PURPOSE OF THE STOP 
Even if the original stop of Flynn and Juma was somehow justified, Trooper Bowies' 
stated purpose was first, the traffic violation, secondly, Flyim's lack of a valid drivers license, 
and finally, whether Flynn or Juma had any warrants. Certainly, during the course of the 
detention for these purposes, a well-trained and experienced law enforcement officer will look 
for other indicia of criminal activity. 
However, the facts herein are that the very first thing Trooper Bowles told Flynn was that 
he was going to only issue a warning citation to her for driving without a license, and require that 
Juma drive the car away, after doing a background check. Both Flynn and Juma passed the 
check; neither had any wants or warrants. 
Trooper Bowles did discover, however, during the background check, that Juma had 
some prior arrests for DUI and for narcotics possession (it must be noted that all of Juma5 s prior 
arrests for drug possession resulted in dismissals, and his only conviction is for a DUI). Trooper 
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Bowles detained Flynn and Juma some 18 minutes, found no reason to arrest or detain either any 
further, and issued Flynn a warning citation, and she started to leave. 
Only then did Bowles detain them again, and begin a new interrogation, and set forth a 
new demand to search the vehicle. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. The United States Supreme Court has held that "stopping 
an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite 
brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Thus, "although a person has a lesser 
expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not lose the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment while in an automobile." State v. Schlossen 774 P.2d 1132,1135 (Utah 
1989). 
To determine whether a Level Two seizure is constitutionally reasonable, courts make a 
dual inquiry: (1) Was the police officers action "justified at its inception"? and (2) Was the 
resulting detention "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
. interference in the first place"? State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 660 (Utah 2002). 
Juma claims the stop was unjustified from the outset. 
The second question is whether the stop continued to be reasonably related in scope to 
the traffic violation which justified it in the first place. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
1994). 
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Regarding the second question, during a traffic stop an officer "may request a driver's 
license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a1 citation." State v. Hansen. 
63 P3d at 660. However, the traffic stop "must be temporary and last no longer than is -
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491,500, 75. 
LJBd.2d 229,103 S.Ct 1319 (1983) (emphasis added). 
In other words: 
Once the purpose of the initial stop is concluded, however, die person must be allowed to 
depart. "Any further temporary detention for investigative questioning after 
fulfilling the purpose for the initial traffic stop" constitutes an illegal seizure, unless 
an officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality. 
State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d at 660. (emphasis added). 
Thus, the issue is not how long the additional detention lasted or how intrusive it was. 
The Utah Supreme Court is clear: "Any further temporary detention" for investigative 
questioning after fulfilling the original purpose for the initial traffic stop constitutes an illegal 
seizure, unless an officer has probable cause to arrest or a reasonable suspicion of a further 
illegality. Id 
u 
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In determining whether a person remains seized within the meaning for Fourth 
Amendment, after the original purpose of a traffic stop has been fulfilled, Utah courts 
have followed the totality of the circumstances standard: A person is seized under the 
Fourth Amendment when, considering the totality of the circumstances, the police 
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to 
decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter and go about his or her 
business. State v. Mogen, 52 P.3d 462,466 (Utah App. 2002), citing United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,554,100 S.Ct 1870,1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). 
One example of police conduct that constitutes illegal detention beyond the scope 
of the purpose of an ordinary traffic stop is when police ask questions about whether a. 
vehicle's occupants possess drugs. The "correct rule" regarding this type of questioning 
is that: "in strict accordance with Terry and its progeny, questioning during a traffic stop 
must be limited to the purpose of the traffic stop and thus may not be extended to the 
subject of drugs." Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop " From Start to Finish: 
Too Much "Routine/'Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843,1887 
(August 2004), citing, inter alia, United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(stating that "[subsequent or concurrent detentions for questioning [about drugs] are 
justified only when the officer has "reasonable suspicion" 'of illegal transactions in drugs 
or of any other serious crime.'"), quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491,498-99, 75 
L.Ed.2d 229,103 S.Ct. 1319(1983). 
Similarly, requests by police for consent to search a vehicle after questioning 
about drugs is beyond the permissible scope of an ordinary traffic stop and searches 
conducted pursuant to such consent are illegal. Lafave, supra at 1893, citing State v. 
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Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415,419 (Minn. 2003) (suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a 
consent search because the officer's "consent inquiry [about narcotics and weapons]... 
went beyond the scope of the traffic stop and was unsupported by any reasonable 
articulable suspicion."). 
Utah law follows the rule described above. For example, in State v. Hansen, 63 
P.3d 650 (Utah 2002), the court held that the officer exceeded the permissible scope of 
the traffic stop by asking for permission to search the vehicle for drugs without having 
reasonable suspicion to do so. Id at 666-67. Similarly, in State v. Bissegger, 76 P.3d 
178 (Utah App. 2003), the court held that an officer "exceeded the scope of detention 
when he requested permission to search the car." Id at 183-84, citing State v. Robinson. 
797 P.2d 432,437 (Utah App. 1990) (finding Fourth Amendment violation where police 
did not have "the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify their 
continued detention and questioning of the [defendants] once...the purpose for the initial 
stop had been accomplished.5'). 
Particularly instructive to the case at bar is State v. Mogen, 52 P.3d 462 (Utah 
App. 2002). In Mogen, police conducted an investigatory stop of defendant's truck for 
speeding, took the defendant's driver's license, and conducted a routine license and 
warrants check, then returned the defendant's license and issued him a verbal warning for 
speeding. Id. at 464. Then, the officer took a few steps toward his patrol car, turned 
around asked if he could search the truck for drugs. Id. 
On appeal, the State admitted that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to 
justify a search, but argued that "once the officer told Defendant he was free to go and 
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the officer turned around and again approached Defendant, the encounter had de-
escalated to a level-one stop and reasonable suspicion to search was not necessary." Id. 
at 466. 
The court of appeals, however, rejected the State's position and upheld the trial 
court's ruling that the "[defendant remained seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when the officer asked to search his truck" and concluded that therefore the 
evidence discovered during the subsequent consensual search was properly suppressed. 
Idat467. 
Similarly, in the case at bar, Trooper Bowies' questioning of the driver about 
drugs was beyond the scope of any permissible stop. Bowles extended the encounter by 
asking for permission to search the vehicle for drugs. Moreover, Bowles started 
questioning the occupants for permission to search without any reason for believing there 
could be drugs in the vehicle. In addition, even when he was told that there were no 
drugs in the vehicle he continued to investigate and detain the occupants by asking for 
permission to search the vehicle anyway. Such questioning was outside the scope of the 
circumstances that justified the initial stop and thus constituted an unreasonable seizure 
of the vehicle's occupants. 
ARGUMENT IIL 
TROOPER BOWLES' WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
VIOLATES DEFENDANTS5 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Warrantless searches "arcper se unreasonable," "subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 
347 . The exception for a search incident to a lawful arrest applies only to "the area from 
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within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 
Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, at 763. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has clearly ruled that police may search 
the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if it is 
reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or 
that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Arizona v.Gant U.S. 
, No. 07-542, Opinion published on April 21,2009. 
Even if Flynn had been arrested for driving without a license or not yielding to an 
emergency vehicle, the car cannot be searched. But Trooper Bowles first has a dog sniff 
the exterior of the car, and when Bowles makes a different hand signal to the dog, and the 
dog starts barking, Bowles declares that the dog has alerted, and then conducts a full-
scale search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants were stopped without any reasonable articulable suspicion of any 
actual or possible violation of the law. They were detained much longer than necessary 
to effect the purpose of the stop. Ttrooper Bowles terminated the Level II detention when 
he gave Flynn a warning citation and permission to leave; he could not re-engage Flynn 
and Juma without new articlable facts of criminal activity. Bowles conducted a 
warrantless search of defendants5 vehicle despite having released them to leave, and 
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All of the evidence seized from Juma and Flynn should be suppressed as having 
been obtained through unlawful means, in violation of the defendants' Constitutional 
rights. 
DATED this /U day of August, 2009. 
Edward D.Flint 
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Edward D.Flint 4573 
Jonathon W. Grimes 10462 
ACCESS LEGAL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
455 East 400 South, Suite 100 
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Case No.: 091600075 
Judge Wallace A. Lee 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Ramon A. Juma, through counsel of record, 
Edward D. Flint, and Respectfully Submits the following Supplemental Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
ISSUE NUMBER 1: GOOD FAITH MISTAKE 
Defendant assumes the State will argue that Trooper Bowles' mistake in stopping 
the Defendants' vehicle for failing to change lanes while passing a UDOT maintenance 
vehicle, was a "Good Faith" mistake, thereby negating Defendants' claim that there was 
never any reasonable, articulable suspicion of a violation of law to permit Bowles to 
make the stop in the first place. However, this is an erroneous view of Utah law. 
Generally, the state of mind of the police is not relevant in assessing whether 
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there has been Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations. Whether a person is "in custody" 
for Miranda purposes, for example, is viewed by the court objectively, based on the 
circumstances, not the state of mind of the police or the defendant. Whether there is 
probable cause to arrest is viewed objectively, not the officer's state of mind. 
But when it comes to determining whether the exclusionary rule should apply, the 
court frequently focuses on the good faith of the.police - the office making the arrest, or 
the officer providing information that prompts the arrest. 
In gauging the legality of the stop of a motor vehicle, basic hornbook law is that 
the officer's "actual" motivation is not relevant; what counts is whether the driver, from a 
purely objective point of view, was violating a motor vehicle law. Wren v. United States, 
517 U.S. 806 (1996); United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008); United ' 
States v. Nunez, 455 F.3d 1223,1226 (11th Cir. 2006). Thus, the notion of a "pretextuaJ" 
arrest is a non sequitur. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783,787 (10th Cir. 
1995) {en banc). Either there was a motor vehicle offense, or there was not. What 
motivated the officer is not relevant. 
If the state acknowledges that there was not probable cause for the arrest/search, 
the prosecution may argue that the police acted in good faith, but this means "objective" 
good faith, not "subjective" good faith. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). What 
counts is what information was known to the officer and whether, given that information, 
he acted in good faith in making the arrest or the search. 
But a mistake as to the taw - even if it is in good faith - is not a valid "defense" to 
suppression. Decisions in Utah appear to hew closer to the line: mistakes of law are 
never "objectively reasonable" whereas mistakes of fact are often forgiven. See, e.g., 
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United States v. DeGasso, 69 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2004); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 
(Utah Court of Appeals 1988); State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d 7 (Utah Court of Appeals 
1999); United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Valadez-Valadez, 525 F.3d 987 (10th Cir, 2008). 
So when it comes to deciding whether a defendant's Fourth or Fifth Amendment 
rights have been violated, the basic rule is that police officers' intentions are not what 
matters. When it comes to the question of the application of the exclusionary rule after it 
has been decided that the objective facts establish a violation of the defendant's Fourth or 
Fifth Amendment rights, however, the police officer's state of mind is front and center, 
assuming he acts reasonably, given the objective facts known to him. 
In this case, Trooper Bowles testified at the Preliminary Hearing that the 
Defendants were stopped for the sole and exclusive reason that the driver (Flynn) failed 
to move into the unoccupied left lane while passing the UDOT vehicles on the right side 
shoulder of the freeway, which had their yellow lights flashing. (Transcript, p. 13, line 25 
through p. 17, line 4). As previously argued, this is not a violation of law, 
ISSUE NUMBER 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCH NOT PERMITTED 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that we reach the issue of whether Trooper 
Bowles could search Defendants' vehicle based upon his determination that the totality of 
the circumstances, coupled with his dog alerting and indicating possible presence of 
illegal drugs, gave Bowles the unfettered authority to conduct a warrantless search of the 
vehicle. It is not disputed that Bowles lacked any permission or consent to search, as 
each Defendant specifically declined to consent to any search. 
The Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section, 14, states: 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized 
There is no reason why Trooper Bowles could not have called into his dispatch to 
start the process of obtaining a search warrant. There were no exigent circumstances, 
since both Defendants were outside of the vehicle and could not have hidden or destroyed 
any potential evidence in the vehicle. The United States Supreme Court recently 
reiterated that Fourth Amendment analyses should always begin "with the basic rule that 
'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are perse unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' Arizona v. Gant 129 S. Ct 
1710,1716 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,357 (1967)). And Utah 
law makes clear that any police detention must be justified by reasonable suspicion of a 
crime; police detention is no longer justified after reasonable suspicion dissipates. See 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, K 31,63 P.3d 650 (stating that once the reason for the 
traffic stop has been resolved, i.e., reasonable suspicion has dissipated, "[a]ny further 
temporary detention... constitutes an illegal seizure"). 
ISSUE NUMBER 3: DISPOILATION OF EVIDENCE 
Trooper Bowles admitted, during testimony at the Preliminary Hearing, that his 
uniform microphone was inoperable, that the batteries were dead, and that is the reason 
why all conversations outside of his patrol vehicle were not recorded; (Transcript p. 23 
line 14, through p. 24, line 12). Part of the Trooper's observations used in determining - o 
the "totality of the circumstances" giving rise to his increased articulable suspicions, * o 
CD 
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justifying further detention and search, were his conversations with Defendants outside of 
his patrol vehicle. 
Utah Highway Patrol Operating Policy 3-3-16 was promulgated in 1996 and 
revised in 2005 to govern, among other things the appropriate usage of the mobile video 
recording ("M.V.R") equipment that is standard in Utah Highway Patrol vehicles. The 
purpose of the procedures is to maximize the benefits of this equipment in the 
prosecution of various offenses and in the evaluation of troopers' performance. The 
Operating Policy is explicit in stating that troopers "shall follow the procedures set forth 
in this policy". Section III-A-2 states, "It is mandatory that M.V.R. equipment operators 
record both audio and video portions of all police related activities." Section III-A-3 
further states that the M.V.R. equipment will continue recording until the incident has 
concluded. "If the recording is stopped before the incident concludes, the trooper will 
state on the tape why the equipment is being turned off." 
The purpose for these instructions is clear. In a case such as a DUI, or the instant 
case where the totality of circumstances is most relevant, the interpretation of a 
defendant's demeanor, appearance and speech patterns are crucial for the finder of fact to 
make a correct determination, and certainly the content of the conversation, the exact 
questions asked and the precise answers given. Videotape evidence is particularly useful , 
because it allows a jury, instead of receiving testimony through the filter of a testifying 
officer or defendant, to "draw Us own conclusions" State v. Zinsli, 156 Or. App. 245, 
254 (Or. 1998) (emphasis in original). However, in this case, Trooper Bowles decided to 
depart from Utah Highway PatroPs Policy.. 
. *T* -. 
In the wake of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), a tremendous number of ££ 
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cases have dealt with the ramifications of the destruction of evidence in light of the Brady 
court's ruling that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or 
punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. While it cannot 
be argued that any State agent literally destroyed evidence, Defendant urges this Court to 
recognize that Trooper Bowies' actions have the same net result. 
ISSUE NUMBER 4: DISSIPATION OF REASONABLE SUSPICION 
Once Trooper Bowles chose to give a warning citation to Defendant Flynn, he 
permitted her to exit his patrol vehicle, gave her a warning citation and returned all of her 
other documents, he has capitulated that all reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity 
had dissipated. Flynn was leaving when Bowles stopped her again and asked for more 
information. Utah law makes clear that any police detention must be justified by 
reasonable suspicion of a crime; police detention is no longer justified after reasonable 
suspicion dissipates. See State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, If 31,63 P.3d 650 (stating that 
once the reason for the traffic stop has been resolved, i.e., reasonable suspicion has 
dissipated, "[a]ny further temporary detention... constitutes an illegal seizure"). The 
Fourth Amendment does not allow officers to prolong a flawed encounter. State v. 
Morris, 2009 UTApp 181. 
It is simply logical that an officer gives a driver a warning citation, returns her 
paperwork, and she begins to leave, that the officer's previous suspicions, supported by 
whatever observations he has already made, are now dissipated; otherwise, the officer 
would not give the citation and documents to the driver, which is a clear indication of the 
end of the traffic stop. 
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CONSLCUSION 
The State's evidence in this case must be suppressed. The officer had no legal 
basis to make a traffic stop. His mistake of law is not an excuse. Even ifthe officer had 
established probable cause to search the vehicle, he had no authority to conduct a 
warrantless search; there were no exigent circumstances. Since a "totality of the 
circumstances" is the required standard in determining whether there were sufficient 
articulated facts to permit the detention, the Trooper's microphone failure, in violation of 
his own agency's policy, has eliminated many of those facts from being objectively 
reviewed, and prompts a Brady concern that exculpatory evidence has been withheld or 
destroyed. Finally, any facts amounting to reasonable suspicion had dissipated enough 
for the officer to give the driver a warning and by all appearances, to leave; his re-
stopping and re-detaining of the Defendants after the dissipation of suspicion was a 
violation of their rights, 
WHEREFORE, Defendants Pray this Court to Order the Suppression of all 
Evidence seized by the State in this matter. 
DATED this (/I day of September, 2009. 
•• /kfco 
Edward D. Flint 
Attorney for Defendant Juma 
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Sevier County Attorney 
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Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (435) 896-2675 
Fax No.: (435) 896-1706 
3IXTr? OfyPfWftf dfmpT 
mNOV 17 PMMI0 
/J)— 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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vs. 




MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 091600075 
Judge Wallace A. Lee 
The State of Utah submits the following Memorandum in 
opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and requests 
that the Court deny Defendant's Motion. 
FACTS 
1. On March 31, 2009, a Tuesday, at approximately 9:30 
a.m., Trooper Nick Bowles was sitting in the median conducting traffic 
patrol on 1-70. 
2. The Trooper's position was east of Salina approximately 
one quarter-mile east of the eastbound on-ramp. His cruiser is facing 
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3. To the south and east of the Trooper's location, behind 
him, at a distance of twenty feet, Utah Department of Transportation 
(UDOT) crews were working on a highway traffic sign for the eastbound 
lanes. Three trucks and a loader were parked or working on the 
shoulder, off the roadway to the right of the eastbound lanes- All of 
the vehicles which had amber emergency lights were flashing. 
4. One UDOT truck was parked west of the sign with one half 
of the vehicle on the gravel shoulder and one half on the pavement but 
not in the lane of traffic. The other two UDOT trucks and loader were 
parked or operating off the pavement, on the gravel shoulder with 
flashing lights. Workers on the ground were walking around. 
5. At the location of the trooper and the UDOT crew, the 
acceleration lane of.the on-ramp had fully merged with the lane of 
traffic. No solid line was preventing vehicles from changing lanes at 
the location of the UDOT crew. 
6. When Trooper Bowles first observed the Defendant's 
vehicle, it was accelerating up the on-ramp to merge with the 
eastbound freeway. A tractor-trailer semi was in front of the 
Defendant's vehicle and was also merging onto the freeway. 
7. The Trooper observed both vehicles travel in the same 
lane passing the UDOT crews without slowing down or moving over. The 
Trooper's observations were that both vehicles were accelerating and 
could have moved over in their lane or safely changed lanes. 
8. The trooper concluded that it was unsafe for the 
vehicles to travel close to the UDOT crews without slowing down, . 
OQ 
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taken by the Defendant's vehicle of any kind even within its own lane. 
9. Upon his approach to the stopped vehicle, Trooper Bowles 
noticed an unusual amount of luggage. The Defendant's vehicle was a 
Chevrolet HHR which is a small SUV with an open storage-luggage 
compartment. The officer testified that normal luggage for a trip as 
described by the Defendant would be two to four pieces of luggage. 
The Trooper estimated the luggage at six to seven pieces, packed as if 
moving instead of traveling or shopping. 
10. Trooper Bowles also noticed that the occupants were 
unusually nervous. The Trooper admitted that most drivers are nervous 
during a traffic stop, but the Defendant and driver showed extreme 
nervousness with trembling hands and appeared frantic in their search 
for licenses and registration. Also noteworthy was the Defendant's 
effort to get out of the vehicle which the Trooper noted is very 
unusual and generally indicates an attempt to keep or divert the 
officer away from the vehicle. 
11. The Trooper obtains identification from each occupant 
and notes the state of registration of the vehicle. The Defendant is 
from Kansas, the driver is from Michigan and the vehicle is registered 
in Nebraska. Trooper Bowles testified that this is an indicator of 
drug trafficking because the enterprise brings together people from 
different areas, renting cars, and transporting drugs across the 
country. 
12. Trooper Bowles asks Ms. Flynn, the driver, to accompany 
him to his cruiser to issue a citation or warning. Once in his 
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doing so, he engages Ms. Flynn in conversation about her travel plans. 
13. The Trooper learns from Ms. Flynn. that they had begun 
their trip on Wednesday and it took two days to drive. They had 
stayed five days in Reno, Nevada at multiple hotels because Mr. Juma 
has a player's club membership by which his rooms are paid for by the 
casinos. Because it was only early Tuesday morning and it takes ten 
hours to get to Sevier County from Reno, Trooper Bowles was suspicious 
of her story. According to her account, she should have still been in 
Reno until Wednesday, the following day. 
14. While waiting for dispatch after finishing the warning, 
Trooper Bowles went back to the Defendant's vehicle to speak with Mr. 
Juma. He learned from him that they had only been gone three days; 
stayed in San Francisco at only one hotel, a Holiday Inn. Mr. Juma 
specifically said they had not gone anywhere else. 
15. Trooper Bowles returned to his cruiser and confronted 
Ms. Flynn about the California trip. Ms. Flynn is careful in her 
answer and tries to buy some time to think by responding with a 
question: "On this trip?" Once she figures out that Mr. Juma must 
have mentioned California instead of Reno to the Trooper, she confirms 
that "we did go into California for a day." 
16. During this time, dispatch returned an arrest history 
for Mr. Juma including drug arrests. Trooper Bowles also noted that 
the occupants mentioned traveling from known drug trafficking sources. 
17. Trooper Bowles then issued the warning to Ms. Flynn, 
returned her documents, and asked her if she had any questions. Ms. 
Flynn then got out of the vehicle. The Trooper did not tell her she 
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was free to go nor that she was detained; but as she was leaving, he 
asked her if he could talk to her some more. 
18. Trooper Bowles testified that he would not have allowed 
either occupant to leave. He requested permission to search the 
vehicle from each occupant and was denied consent. It was Trooper 
Bowles' intent to conduct a canine search of the vehicle and that is 
in fact what the officer did. 
19. Trooper Bowles testified that he and his police dog, 
Cica, are certified by the Utah Police Officer Standards and Training 
Academy for narcotics detection and handling. The Trooper explained 
that his dog is an "agressive indicator", which means the dog will 
bark, paw and/or scratch to indicate narcotics. 
20. In this case, Cica indicated with both barking and 
scratching, which is a strong indication, on the rear passenger door. 
Trooper Bowles then conducted a search of the vehicle and located two 
bags of marijuana by the rear passenger door. 
21. Trooper Bowles has received extensive training in drug 
interdiction techniques. He is an award-winning member of the Utah 
Highway Patrol drug interdiction squad. He regularly consults and 
contributes to drug interdiction databases. He has personally made 
approximately 9,000 to 10,000 traffic stops resulting in around 500 
drug arrests, which includes over one hundred interdictions, or 
11
 loads " , of drugs. 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
!• This was a lawful traffic stop because the officer 
observed a traffic violation. 
It is fundamental, black-letter constitutional law that 
reasonable suspicion is required to stop a motor vehicle. Reasonable 
suspicion for a traffic stop includes a traffic violation committed in 
the presence of a police officer. 
Among the situations that courts have 
identified where a police officer is justified in 
stopping a vehicle are: (1) when the officer 
observes the driver commit a traffic violation; 
(2) when the officer has a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic 
offense . ..; and (3) when the officer has a 
reasonable articulable* suspicion that the driver 
is engaged in more serious criminal activity, 
such as transporting drugs. 
State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992}. 
Trooper Bowles was monitoring eastbound traffic on a freeway 
with a UDOT crew on the other side of the freeway. It is beyond 
dispute that the shoulder of a freeway is a dangerous place to be. 
Indeed, that is the reason for laws designed to protect people stopped 
on the freeway from passing motorists such as the following statute at 
issue in this case: 
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41-6a-904. Approaching emergency vehicle - Necessary-
signals ~ Stationary emergency vehicle ~ Duties of respective 
operators• 
(3) The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a 
stationary tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle that is 
displaying flashing amber lights, shall: 
(a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; and 
(b) provide as much space as practical to the 
stationary tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle. 
Based upon the requirements of this law, the Defendant's 
vehicle committed a traffic violation in the presence of a police 
officer. Trooper Bowles is watching eastbound traffic merge onto the 
freeway from the Salina on-ramp. There is no other traffic except for 
the Defendant and a semi truck in front of the Defendant. Both 
vehicles have merged onto the freeway in a traffic lane with no lane 
markers, signs or other vehicles impeding their travel. There are 
four UDOT vehicles on the side of the road with flashing lights, 
within feet of the travel lane. It is broad daylight, approximately 
9:30 in the morning. 
Despite all of these circumstances, the Defendant's vehicle 
did not slow down, move over or change lanes. Any or all of these 
evasive maneuvers could have been taken at the time because there was 
nothing preventing movement or slowing of the Defendant's vehicle. 
The officer, who was in the best position to observe the situation, 
testified that it was unsafe for the Defendant's vehicle to travel so 
close to the UDOT workers. He concluded that it was a violation of 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6a-904(3) when the Defendant's vehicle 
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did not slow down, move over in the lane or change lanes. According 
to the plain language of the statute, it was a violation of Utah state 
law and justifies the traffic stop of Defendant's vehicle, 
2• Reasonable suspicion to detain defendant developed 
during the traffic stop. 
A central and dispositive issue in this case is whether the 
officer had reason to continue the detention after the traffic stop 
was completed. 
Investigative questioning that further detains 
the driver must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity. 
Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on 
specific, articulable facts drawn from the 
totality of circumstances facing the officer at 
the time of the stop. 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994}(emphasis added). 
As a "totality of the circumstances" test, the Court must 
consider all elements that the officer considered suspicious and 
determine whether they, as a whole, amount to reasonable suspicion. 
Most importantly, the Court must weigh the facts with "deference to an 
officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious 
actions." United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 1997). 
This is important because a great deal of time and money is spent 
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training police officers to detect crime in seemingly innocent 
scenarios. Even the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned 
deference to police officers. 
When discussing how reviewing courts should make 
reasonable suspicion determinations, we have said 
repeatedly that they must look at the "totality 
of circumstances" of each case to see whether the 
detaining officer has a "particularized and 
objective basis" for suspecting legal wrongdoing. 
. This process allows officers to draw on their own 
experience and specialized training to make 
inferences from and deductions about the 
cumulative information available to them that 
might well, elude an untrained person• 
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, (2002) (emphasis added) . 
This Court should do the same by analyzing the totality of 
circumstances the officer relied upon to detain and question the 
Defendant. It is true that any one of the following factors standing 
alone would be insufficient to justify a detention because they are 
also consistent with innocent behavior. However, when they are 
combined into one large picture confronting a police officer, they 
make him suspicious of other criminal activity. Consider the 
following factors combined into one suspicious episode: 
1. Excessive amount of baggage/luggage. 
2. Unusual, extreme nervousness of occupants and frantic 
search for papers. 
3. Defendant's attempt to divert or move officer away 
from open vehicle window by getting out of vehicle. 
CD 
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4. Licenses and registration from various states. 
£. Implausible time frame of driver's travel history. 
6. Conflicting statements between driver and passenger as 
to: 
a) where they stayed; 
b) how long they stayed; and 
c) what state they visited. 
7. Driver's hesitancy in confirming Defendant's version 
of events about going to California. 
8. Defendant's prior history of drug offenses. 
9. Travel to and from known drug sources. 
As the traffic stop progresses, the officer gathers these 
factors of suspicion from his observations and questions. He does not 
unnecessarily prolong the stop nor does he do anything improper in his 
investigation. As he issues the warning, he makes a calculation to 
determine if there is enough suspicion to continue the detention. 
This is exactly what the courts have required: 
[T]he evidence thus collected must be seen 
and weighed not in terms of library analysis by 
scholars, but as understood by those versed in 
the field of law enforcement. Trained officers 
aware of modes and patterns of operation of 
certain kinds of lawbreakers can draw inferences 
and made deductions that might well elude 
untrained persons. 
United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir. 1997) 
We do not expect a trained and conscientious police officer 
to ignore all of these indicators of criminal activity. Reasonable 
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suspicion is more than a mere hunch. It is the cumulative effect of a 
collection of individual facts that combine to create suspicion. When 
an officer has reasonably made that evaluation, he is justified in 
detaining and investigating further. Trooper Bowles was correct in 
his assessment that these nine different factors constitute reasonable 
suspicion and therefore his actions to detain and question were legal. 
3 - A canine sniff is constitutional and constitutes 
probable cause to search a vehicle without a warrant. 
It has been over twenty-five years since the United States 
Supreme Court upheld searches by trained narcotics dogs.-
[W]e conclude that the particular course of 
investigation that the agents intended to pursue 
here - exposure of respondents' luggage which was 
located in a public place, to a trained canine -
did not constitute a "search" within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
The basis for this ruling is that if a person is otherwise 
lawfully detained, the canine sniff is simply not intrusive. In 2005, 
the Court extended the ruling to vehicles stopped by police because 
the same reasoning applies. 
A dog sniff conducted during a concededly 
lawful traffic stop that reveals no information 
37 
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other than the location of a substance that no 
individual has any right to possess does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 1, 5 (2005). 
Since a canine sniff is not a search, the fact that Trooper 
Bowles deployed his narcotics dog on the vehicle is not unlawful so 
long as the Defendant was being lawfully detained. This is the reason 
that the foregoing analysis of reasonable suspicion to detain was 
critical to this case. Because Trooper Bowles had reasonable 
suspicion that more serious criminal activity was afoot, he was 
legally justified in detaining the Defendant until that suspicion 
could be dispelled. The quickest, most effective and, as set forth 
above, legal means to do so, was running a canine around the vehicle. 
Moreover, the courts have repeatedly held that a drug dog 
alert is probable cause to conduct an actual search of a vehicle and 
its compartments. Because of the automobile exception, no warrant is 
required. This body of law was summarized succinctly by the Tenth 
Circuit Court: 
Once, the dog "keyed", the police had 
probable cause to believe the automobile 
contained narcotics. Thereafter, the search of 
Stone's car and the duffel bag in which the 
narcotics were found was justified by the 
"automobile exceptionn to the search warrant 
requirement. The automobile exception justifies 
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highway, including all containers therein, upon 
probable cause to believe it contains contraband. 
United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 364 (10th Cir. 1989). 
This is a straight-forward case of fundamental Fourth 
Amendment law. The Defendant's vehicle was stopped for a traffic 
violation. During the stop, the officer observed reasonable suspicion 
of drug trafficking. After the traffic violation was completed and 
consent to search was denied, Trooper Bowles exercised his discretion 
to detain the Defendant and conduct a canine sniff of the exterior of 
the vehicle. The dog, a certified narcotics canine, indicated on the 
vehicle and the trooper searched the vehicle pursuant to the 
automobile warrant exception. The Defendant has identified no 
constitutional violation. 
4„ Defendant has not shown a Brady violation. 
The Defendant "urges" this Court to disregard fifty years of 
jurisprudence and penalize the State for the inadvertent, 
unintentional failure to record a few minutes of conversation. There 
is no prior precedent for such a proposition and the Defendant 
provides none nor even a good faith argument to extend existing case 
law. The Defendant has failed to carry any of the burden of proof or 
persuasion. His Motion should be denied. 
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5» There is no doctrine of "dissipation o£ reasonable 
suspicion." 
The Defendant argues that a "police detention is no longer 
justified after reasonable suspicion dissipates." He cites the Hansen 
case for this rule. But, a careful reading of Hansen shows no such 
holding. 
Once the purpose of the initial stop is 
concluded, however, the person must be allowed to 
depart. ,T%Any further temporary detention for 
investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the 
purpose for the initial traffic stop'" 
constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer 
has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a 
further illegality. 
Hansen, 63 P.3d at 660. 
The Hansen decision simply reiterates the age-old rule that once the 
purpose of the traffic stop has been satisfied, the driver must be 
released unless reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity is 
observedv. There is nothing in the case about the dissipation of 
reasonable suspicion. In fact, the idea that reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause dissipating is illogical and incomprehensible. If a 
crime has been or is being committed, neither the passage of time nor 
circumstances can change the fact that it was committed. Suspects are 
arrested and prosecuted every day for crimes that occur years in the 
CD 
past. For the same reasons reasonable suspicion of criminal activity CO 
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does not dissipate. It may become stale if the Defendant were to 
leave the scene, return home, change cars, empty the car, etc. 
However, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the scene of a 
traffic stop does not dissipate. It is either confirmed or dispelled 
by further investigation. 
The Defendant takes his cue for a "dissipation" theory from 
the recent case of State v. Morris, 214 P.3d 883 (Utah App. 2009) . 
The following is the quote: 
And Utah law makes clear that any police 
detention must be justified by reasonable 
suspicion of a crime; police detention is no 
longer justified after reasonable suspicion 
dissipates. See State v*. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 
Paragraph 31, 63 P.3d 650 (stating that once the 
reason for the traffic stop has been resolved, 
i.e., reasonable suspicion has dissipated, "[a]ny 
further temporary detention ... constitutes an 
illegal seizure"). 
Morris, 214 P.3d at 887. 
As is clear from the language of the Court, "dissipated" 
means the same thing as "dispelled" or "resolved" as the Court puts 
it. But it has no application to this case. The Defendant is arguing 
that reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking dissipated inside the 
police car before the officer did anything to dispel or "resolve" it. 
Using the Defendant's vernacular, reasonable suspicion in this case 
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investigate drug trafficking. Since he chose to use a canine sniff to 
do so, the reasonable suspicion did not "dissipate" until the dog was 
finished, and since the dog indicated, thereby creating probable cause 
to search, reasonable suspicion did not dissipate. 
The Defendant's Motion should be denied in its entirety. 
DATED this j~T day of November, 2009. 
j^v^rZy 
•^ fr«—"**— 
DALE P. EYRE f 
Sevier County Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with 
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid on the \~~i day of 
November, 20097 addressed as follows: 
Mr, Edward D. Flint 
Attorney at Law 
455 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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SEVIER COUNTY 
895 East 300 North, Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (435) 896-2700; Facsimile: (435) 896-8047 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAMON A. JUMA, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DIAMOND K. FLYNN, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 091600075 
091600076 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
On 11 August 2009, Defendant Juma filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, On 28 August 
2009, Defendant Flynn filed a Notice of Joinder in Motion to Suppress, joining Defendant 
Juma's motion. On or about 22 September 2009, Defendant Juma filed Defendant's 
Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Evidence Suppression. 
Also, On 22 September 2009 the Court conducted an evideiitiary suppression hearing. On 1A 
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17 November 2009, the State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. On 6 January 2009, Defendant Jurna filed a request to submit for decision. 
This motion is now ready for a decision. 
DECISION 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denied. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
L On 31 March 2009, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Trooper Ni6k Bowles, with the Utah 
Highway Patrol was conducting traffic patrol on Interstate % near Salina, Utah, 
2. Trooper Bowles was in the median near mile post 58, approximately one quarter-mile 
east of the Salina on-ramp. 
3. Trooper Bowles observed a black, four-door Chevrolet sedaft enter the freeway behind a 
semi-trailer going eastbound* Both the semi and the black Chevrolet remained in the right 
(outside) lane as they passed several Utah Department of Transportation maintenance 
vehicles on the side of the road. The left (inside) lane was unoccupied. 
4. Trooper Bowles did not see either vehicle move over in their lane or even crowd the 
center line. 
5. The UDOT crew was on the south side of the freeway approximately a quarter mile past 
<© 
the on ramp. The UDOT crew appeared to be replacing a rMdside sign. There were <*D 
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several vehicles on the gravel shoulder and one was up on the shoulder, partially on the 
pavement. Trooper Bowles felt it was dangerous to the safety of the UDOT workers for 
the black Chevrolet not to move over as it passed. At that point, Trooper Bowles decided 
to stop the black Chevrolet vehicle. 
6. At both the preliminary hearing and the suppression hearing Trooper Bowles testified he 
stopped the black Chevrolet for failure to move over for ati emergency vehicle. 
7. Defendant Juma was in the front passenger seat of the black Chevrolet, which he had 
rented, and Defendant Flynn was driving. 
8. As Trooper Bowles approached the black Chevrolet vehicle, he could see there were only 
two occupants. The luggage compartment of the vehicle was visible as the trooper 
approached and he immediately noticed that the entire rear portion of the vehicle was 
filled with luggage. In Trooper Bowles5 experience, the amount of luggage in the vehicle 
was excessive for two people. 
9. Trooper Bowles made contact with Defendants who seemed unusually nervous and even 
frantic. Their hands were shaking as they retrieved their identifying documents and 
handed them to the trooper. 
10. Trooper Bowles obtained identification for both Defendants which showed the driver, 
Flynn, was from Michigan and the passenger, Juma, was from Kansas. The vehicle was a 
15-
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rental and had been rented in Nebraska. Trooper Bowles testified that in his training and 
experience it is common in drug trafficking situations for tlii participants and vehicles to 
all be from different states. 
11. Trooper Bowles then spoke with both defendants separately* Their stories about their 
travel together did not match and this caused Trooper Bowles further concern. 
12. At about this time, Trooper Bowles received infonnation from dispatch indicating 
Defendant Juma had a previous criminal history involving drugs. 
13. Trooper Bowles then gave Flynn a written warning notice, returned her identification 
card and then, as she started to leave, Trooper Bowles asked if he could talk to her a little 
more. Flynn agreed to speak to Trooper Bowles. 
14. Trooper Bowles told Flynn about the things he had noticed during the course of the stop 
that caused him to suspect drugs. He asked if he could search the vehicle. Flynn told 
Trooper Bowles he would have to speak to Mr. Juma because he was the person who 
rented the vehicle. Trooper Bowles then asked Juma for permission to search and Juma 
refused. 
15. At this point, Trooper Bowles decided to deploy his trained canine. At the time, Trooper 
Bowles was a certified canine handler. The dog was also a trained and certified drug 
CO 
detection dog. As Trooper Bowles took the dog around Defendants' vehicle, the dog <£> 
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alerted, indicating drugs in the rear of the vehicle, and at the right, rear bumper, then the 
dog more aggressively indicated the presence of drugs by barking and scratching on the 
rear passenger door of the vehicle. 
16. Based on this indication by the canine, Trooper Bowles decided to search the vehicle 
where he discovered marijuana on the floorboard, near the f ear passenger door, and in the 
rear of the vehicle. 
ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . ."UnitedStates v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,550 (U.S. 1980). 
The Court first considers whether there was a seizure and subsequent search. The Court 
concludes there was a seizure because stopping an automobile and the resulting detention is a 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213,215 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155,157-158 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), held, "the stopping of an automobile is constitutionally justified if the stop is incident to a 
lawful citation for a traffic violation." The central issue in this motion is whether Trooper 
<T» 
Bowles had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Defendants' vehicle. UD 
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Defendants argue Trooper Bowles did not have reasonable suspicion to stop them. 
Trooper Bowles stopped their vehicle because it failed to move ovef and change lanes while 
approaching and passing the UDOT crew on the eastbound right shoulder of Interstate 70. 
Defendants argue there is no requirement for the driver of a vehicle to change lanes when 
passing a highway maintenance vehicle. 
The State argues that Defendants' vehicle did not slow down, move over, or change lanes 
and thus Defendant Flynn violated Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a*904(3), and created a 
dangerous situation for the UDOT crews. However, Trooper Bowies testified at both the 
Preliminary Hearing and the Evidentiary Hearing that he stopped f)efendants because they failed 
to move over to the left lane for an emergency vehicle.1 The UDOT vehicles with their amber 
colored lights flashing are not "authorized emergency vehicles."2 The UDOT vehicles with their 
amber lights flashing are governed by Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-904(3) which states: "The 
operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle 
that is displaying flashing amber lights, shall: (a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; and (b) provide 
1
 Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-904(2) states: "The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary 
authorized emergency vehicle that is displaying alternately flashing red, red and white, or red and blue lights, shall: 
... (c) if traveling in a lane adjacent to the stationary authorized emergency vehicle and if practical, with due regard 
to safety and traffic conditions, make a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle. 
O 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-102 defines "Authorized emergency vehicle" as fire department vehicles; if** 
police vehicles; ambulances; and other publicly or privately owned vehicles designated by the commissioner of the CD 
Department of Public Safety. ~~ 
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as much space as practical to the stationary tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle/' 
In this case, the Court finds Trooper Bowles made a good faith mistake. He testified that 
he stopped Defendants' vehicle for failure to move over for an emergency vehicle. He 
mistakenly thought there had been a violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-904(2). 
However, the UDOT vehicles are not "authorized emergency vehicles." Therefore, Section 41-
6a-904(3) applies in this case. Section 41-6a~904(3) does not requite motorists to change lanes 
when approaching and passing highway maintenance vehicles. Rather, motorists are only 
required to reduce speed and provide space for the maintenance vehicle. 
In a similar case, State v. Applegate, 194 P.3d 925, 931 (Utah 2008), the Utah Supreme 
Court held, "[an officer's] subjective understanding of the law is irrelevant. Instead, all that 
matters is that [the officer is] able to point to specific and articulable facts regarding [a suspect's] 
conduct which, taken together with rational inferences, created a reasonable suspicion of a 
violation of the traffic laws/' See also, State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d 7 (Ut App 1999). 
In this case, the Court finds that though Trooper Bowles obviously made a mistake about 
the specific traffic law involved, he still had a reasonable articulable suspicion Defendants had 
committed a traffic violation. Trooper Bowles knew Defendant Flynn failed to move over when 
approaching and passing the UDOT crew. Trooper Bowles testified he believed this created a 
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In other words, the Court finds no evidence to suggest Trooper Bowles stopped 
Defendants for a contrived or improper purpose. Instead, he had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that Defendants had violated a traffic law. His subjective understanding (or 
misunderstanding) of the law is irrelevant. Therefore, the Court finds the initial stop and 
detention of Defendants in this case was lawful. 
The next issue in this case is whether die continued detention and questioning of 
Defendants after termination of the initial traffic stop was justified by additional reasonable 
suspicion. After carefully considering all the evidence, the Court concludes Trooper Bowles had 
reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. 
Though many of the traditional factors which typically lead to a finding of reasonable 
suspicion, such as unusual odor, vehicle alterations or physical indications of impairment, are 
absent in this case, the Court finds the following articulated facts sufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion in the totality of the circumstances: (1) Defendants were both from 
different states and the car was rented in a third state; (2) there was an inordinate amount of 
luggage for two people; (3) Defendants were both unusually nervous; (4) Defendants' stories 
about the course and timetable of their travel did not match; and (5) dispatch reported Defendant 
Juma had a criminal history which included drug offenses. 
None of these factors, on their own, is enough for reasonable suspicion. However, 
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viewing them in the totality of the circumstances facing Trooper Bowles at the time of the stop, 
the Court finds they are enough to justify further detention to ask about drugs and to seek 
permission to search the vehicle. The Court finds the resulting detention reasonably related in 
scope to the initial detention. At that point, the Court finds Trooper Bowles also had reasonable 
suspicion to deploy his narcotics dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle. 
The Court finds the additional detention was not unduly l&igthy or unreasonable, nor did 
it occur at an unreasonable place or time. After the dog indicated the presence of drugs, the 
Court finds Trooper Bowles had probable cause not only to continue and expand the detention, 
but to search the vehicle without a warrant. 
It is well settled that exposure to a trained canine does not constitute a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not expose non-contraband items that would 
otherwise be hidden from public view. United State v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,707 (U.S. 1983); 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,409 (U.S. 2005). However, once a narcotics dog indicates the 
presence of narcotics, the police have probable cause to conduct a search. United States v. Stone, 
866 F.2d 359, 364 (10th Cir. 1989). 
Indeed, the Utah Court of Appeals has held "the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement provides that m[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it 
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the vehicle without 
* 1 ": 
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more."1 State v, Despain, 173 P.3d 213, 217 (Utah Ct App. 2007), (quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 
527 US. 465,467,119 S. Ct. 2013,144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999). 
Therefore, the Court concludes that based upon the strong indication by the canine in this 
case, Trooper Bowles had sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle. Accordingly, 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress should be denied. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons listed above, Defendant Juma and Defendant Flynn's Motion to Suppress 
is denied. The Clerk is directed to set this case for a scheduling conference. 
DATED this 
Wallace A- LeeSiE^ 
Digitally signed by Wallace A. Lee 
DN: cn=Walface A. Lee, c=US, o-Sixth District Court, 
.utcourts.gov 
Reason: I am approving this document 
Date: 2010.03.04 15:17:54 -07'00' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On ^\\^_M_MLL\ , 20 (iX a copy of the above documeflt was sent to the following 
by the method indicated: 
Addressee Method 
D Edward Flint 
Jonathon Grimes 
Attorneys for Defendant Juma 
455 East 400 Sout, Ste. 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
• Douglas Neeley 
Attorney for Defendant Flynn 
P.O. Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642 
W Mail 
•. Hand delivery 
• Fax 
• Courthouse box 
£K Mail 
• Hand delivery 
• Fax 
• Courthouse box 
• Dale Eyre 
Sevier County Attorney 
835 East 300 North, Ste. 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
• Mail 
• Hand delivery 
• Fax 
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PAUL D LYMAN 
June 15, 2010 
PRESENT 
Clerk: carolcf 
Prosecutor: DALE P EYRE 
CASEY W JEWKES • 
Defendant 
Defendants Attorney{s) : EDWARD D FLINT 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 8, 1972 
Audio 
Tape Number: NCR Tape Count: 931-944 
CHARGES 
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony-
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/15/2010 Guilty 
ARRAIGNMENT 
The Information is read. 
Advised of rights and penalties. • 
Defendant is arraigned/ 
Defendant waives right to a trial by jury, 
HEARING 
TAPE: NCR COUNT: 931-
Mr Flint advised the Court he will be filing an appeal on Judge 
Lee's denial of Flint's motion to suppress. Def will enter a guilty 
plea today to count 1 in return for the State1s dismissal of count 
2. This plea will be conditionally. 
Mr Eyre states since Def is entering his plea conditionally, that 
the bail bond previously posted will be exonerated. In lieu of 
serving jail time, Def will need to pay a new bail bond, surrender 
his passport, and not travel outside of the 
United States. Def has signed a waiver of rights form. Def states 
he is prepared to contact a bail bondsman today. 
The Court accepts the stipulated agreement between parties and 
notes Mr Flint will file his appeal today. Def is released upon the 
posting of $10,000 bond. Def is to surrender his passport within 
the next 2 weeks to Mr Eyre. in 








Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No: 091600075 Date: Jun 15, 2010 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST 
C/SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL SUSPENDED NOTE 
All jail time is suspended upon posting of a new $10,000 bond. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $9283.00 
Suspended: $9283.00 
Surcharge: $ 
Total Fine: $9283.00 
Total Suspended: $9283.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
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Edward D.Flint 4573 
Jonathon W. Grimes 10462 
Sean Hullinger 09264 
Attorneys for Defendant 
455 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5297 
Fax: (801) 532-2063 
Email: ed@utahaccesslegal.com 
SIXTH DISTRICT COUR' 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 091600075 
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COMES NOW, Defendant Ramon A. Juma, through Counsel Edward D. Flint, and, 
pursuant to Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby appeals the judgment of 
the Sixth Judicial District Court in Richfield, Sevier County, the Honorable Judge Wallace A. 
Lee. 
Defendant appeals the final order of the above-mentioned Court denying Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress Evidence to the Utah Supreme Court/Utah Court of Appeals; and 
Defendant's conditional guilty plea to Count 1 of the Information: to wit, possession of 
marijuana of more than one pound and less than a hundred pounds with intent to distribute, a 
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Court of Appeals. 
DATED this 14th day of June, 2010. 
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S'XTH DISTRICT COURT 
WJUMI5 PrU-'lt 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SEVIER COUNTY, RICHFIELD DEPARTMENT 





DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
STAY THE EXECUTION OF 
SENTENCE, PENDING APPEAL 
Case No.: 091600075 
Judge Wallace A. Lee 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Ramon A. Juma, through counsel of record, 
Edward D. Flint, and hereby MOVES this Court, pursuant to Rule 27, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, for an Order Staying execution of the Sentence and Commitment in 
the case pending appeal, and states: 
Defendant has filed a Notice of Appeal and Application for a Certificate of 
Probable Cause in the District Court contemporaneously with this Motion: 
Defendant is entitled to have this Court issue a Certificate of Probable Cause that 
the defendant is not likely to flee or fail to appear as required, during the pendency of the 
appeal and that defendant does not pose a danger to the safety of any other person in the CD 
CD 
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community, and should be released under conditions imposed by the Court pursuant to 
Rule 27 (g), U.R. Cr.P. 
DATED this day of June, 2010. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
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Defendant. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Eyre, you 
may proceed when you are ready, Sir. 
MR. EYRE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY-MR.EYRE: * 
Q. Sgt, Bowles, were you on duty on March 
31st of this year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you involved in the investigation 
of the defendants Juma and Flynn? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What caused you to come into contact 
withthesepeople? 
A. As I was sitting stationary in the 
Interstate 70 median near milepost about 58, I 
observed a vehicle traveling in the outside lane. 
There were some UDOT workers on the side of the 
road fixing a sign, basically right close to where 
I was. They did have their overhead lights on. 
The vehicle passed their location without moving 
over for the UDOT workers, so I stopped the 
vehicle. 
Q. Did they stop immediately? 
A. That I recall, yes. 
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Q. Okay, what did you notice upon your 
approach to the vehicle? 
A. I noticed a very large amount of luggage 
inside the vehicle. As I interacted with the 
occupants, they seemed to be very nervous, kind of 
rushing to get their documents. The feeling that I 
got from them was that they was trying to get me 
away from the vehicle. 
Q. You mentioned they are nervous, more 
than usual? 
A. Yes, very much, so. 
Q. What other observations did you notice 
about them, their body movements, anything that 
showed nervousness? 
A. Trembling hands, and then again, it 
seemed to me that they were very rushed in trying 
to provide documents to me. It almost seemed like 
they were frantic trying to find the documents. 
Q. Okay. Who was driving the vehicle? 
A . Ms. Flynn. 
Q. And did she provide any documentation to 
you? 
A. She provided a Michigan identification 
card. She informed me that she did not have a 
license. 
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Q. And Mr. Juma was a passenger in the 
vehicle ? 
A. Correct.. 
Q. Did he provide any documentation? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q . What did he provide? 
A. He provided a Kansas driver's license, 
along with the rental contract for the vehicle. 
Q. Okay. Did you determine who had rented 
the vehicle? 
A. Mr. Juma had. ^ 
Q. Okay. After obtaining this 
documentation, what did you do next? 
A. I returned to my vehicle and asked Ms. 
Flynn to come back with me. 
Q. Okay. Did you speak with her while you 
were in your vehicle? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did you talk about? 
A. Their travels* her association with Mr. 
Juma • 
Q. At any point, did you make any contact 
with Mr. Juma? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you have any discussions with him? 
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exterior of the vehicle. 
Q. Okay. Are you a canine officer? 
A. I was at the time. 
Q. Okay, and did you deploy your dog? 
A. Yes. 
> Q. The dog was with you in your car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, and what happened after the dog 
was deployed? 
.A, When I deployed the dog on the outside 
of the vehicle, he alerted to the odor of narcotics 
and gave an indication of the rear passenger door. 
Q. Okayr with that indication, what did you 
do? 
A. I conducted a search of the vehicle. 
Q, What did you find in the vehicle? 
A." I found three different bags containing 
marijuana, total weights about 33 pounds. There 
was one bag on the floor board by the rear door 
that my canine had indicated on. There were also 
two bags in the rear of the vehicle. 
Q. Why do you believe 33 pounds of 
marijuana is intent to distribute marijuana? 
A. Through my career, I have had many drug 
arrests. Typical amounts for a-user amount would 
[ p THACKERJCO 
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Q. Okay. Can you start with that last 
comment about the identification of the contraband? 
You said that you identified the three bags as 
having marijuana based upon their appearance and 
smell? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Have they been tested otherwise to 
determine? 
A. I'm not sure if they have been submitted 
yet or not. 
Q. Okay. The cocaine, were you involved in 
determining that was cocaine? 
A. Yes, the nic test. 
Q. Did you do a field test on that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, now you weren't there when that 
was found on Mr. Juma? 
A. No, I was not. 
Q. Okay. Let's go back in time to where 
you first spotted the vehicle. They were getting 
on an on ramp? 
A. They were coming.from--They had actually 
come from the on ramp onto the interstate. 
Q. Did you see them coming up the on ramp? 
A. Yeah. 
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Q. It didn't try to pass the truck? 
A. It eventually did once it passed my 
location, but at that time, no, it did not. 
Q. Okay, but while it was on the on ramp, 
you saw it directly behind the semi-trailer? 
A. As it was coming up the- on ramp, yes. 
Q. Okay, where was the UDOT crew? 
A. On the--would be the south side of the 
highway. 
Q. And where, in relationship to the on 
ramp? Weren't they right at the top of the on 
ramp? 
I would say a quarter mile passed it. 
Just passed the on ramp? 
Yes. 







Q. Okay, and were they parked on the 
pavement, or on the shoulder on.the dirt or grassy 
area? 
A. Well, there were.several vehicles there. 
I think a couple of them were down in the grass. 
I believe one of them was up on the shoulder. 
Q. Okay, and by shoulder, do you mean the 
a 1 ii 
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Q. Orange lights. Did any of them have 
red lights, like you have on your patrol car? 
A. Not that I'm aware of, no. 
Q. Did any of them have blue lights, like 
you have on your patrol car? 
A. No. v 
Q. Were any of them flashing white lights? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. You didn't see any red and white in 
combination or red and blue in combination? 
A. As far as I recall, it was all the 
* 
orange lights that UDOT typically has.. 
Q, Standard lights that you would flash as 
your emergency lights on an automobile, for that 
matter? 
"'A. I don't know of too many automobiles 
that have the orange lights on top of their 
vehicles. 
Q. Now, were these the rotating lights, or 
just flashing lights? 
A. I believe they—I don't know what kind 
they have. They have the light bars on top of 
their vehicles. Whether they rotate or flash, I 
don7 t know. 
Q. Okay. I always get confused with the 
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Q. Is that because you saw out of state 
license plates on it? 
A. No, it's because I'm not a commercial 
vehicle officer. I typically deal with passenger 
vehicles. 
Q. But it's the same violation, though, 
isn't it? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Okay, same citation, same violation? 
A. Yes, but I'm much more familiar with 
passenger vehicles.
 t 
Q. Do you know of another law enforcement 
vehicle that was parked at the bottom of that on 
ramp? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. "Were you in radio communication with any 
other officers prior to observing the black 
Chevrolet? 
A. I'm always--I always have that 
capability, but I had not spoken with anybody, no. 
Q. In the minute or two before seeing the. 
black Chevrolet,- did you have any radio contact 
with another patrol car? 
A. No. 
Q. Did a n o t h e r o f f i c e r or p a t r o l c a r from 
u 
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outside of the vehicle are not recorded? 
A. Correct, 
Q. Alright. Now, in fact, after having 
received the information that there were no 
warrants or wants for either of these individuals, 
s 
that the rental company had not reported the car 
stolen or missing, you decided to give Ms* Flynn a 
warning citation, is that correct? 
A. Correct, 
Q. In fact, in your report, you say that 
the very first thing you told her when you asked 
her to come back to your patrol vehicle was that 
you told her you were going to give her a warning 
citation for the violation, is that correct? 
A. Once we were inside of my vehicle, yes. 
Q. Okay, so that was your intent from the 
very beginning, was to give her a warning— 
A, Yes. 
Q. --as long as they both checked out and 
didn't have any warrants? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, Now, they don't have any 
warrants. The car is not stolen. You do give her 
a warning citation? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. She spoke with you a little bit further? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You asked her if she had any weapons or 
illegal items in the vehicle? 
A. Yes . 
Q. Specifically asked if there was any 
narcotics in the vehicle or illegal drugs? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She said no. 
A. Yeah. 





She said it's not for her to decide 
It was Mr. Junta's rental vehicle? 
A. Something to that effect, yes. 
Q. Okay, then you asked Mr. Juma the same 
questions. Are there any weapons or illegal items 
in the car, and he said no? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You asked him, specifically, are there 
any narcotics or illegal drugs, and he said no? 
A. . Correct. 
Q, And you asked him if you could search 
the vehicle, and he said no? • 
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Okay, then you got the dog out? 
Yes . 
oog r _ i , p p i n e a r e a s -j * ' : .- v e h i c l e f o r '• i .: J 
a m i i . 
A . I . i i i i l l , I h M i l l I I '-.'[J I i ii 
canine is 1 will m o v >; my 11 11 ul .ilonq the vehicle 
indicating where T do wanl hi in lo sniff "••-• , 
l i f ' i 111 II i i h , I N ' I I 1 1 1 1 1 i I i i h i i l e 
hey, I bet there's a high probability t ".• • ' ':";•" 's 
air coming out of that. I show him, I detail u^e 
vehicle when I go around it, yes. 
Q. And you went around the car 360 degrees 
from- the back all the way around to the side, to 
the front, the other side and back to the back 
again all the while pointing to where the dog 
should sniff •.-.;• .. ; .:e dog sniffed? 
A. 
.•M not give an indication during 
any . • -hose times? He didn't indicate? 
A. ndicate. 
Q. .-..- . he fir * r i v around the car? 
A. recall if it was the first or 
R! 
'< IhLAIURfcK?' 
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Q. And of those arrests, how many contained 
amounts that you considered intent to distribute or 
trafficking loads? 
A. Intent to distribute, I would say over 
100 actual. What we consider to be a pipeline or 
a load of narcotics, I would say roughly 70. • 
Q. Okay. Now, at the time of the 
preliminary hearing, you indicated that you had 
stopped the vehicle for failing to yield to an 
emergency vehicle, is that correct? 
A. Failing to move ojver for it, yes. 
Q. Alright. Now, at the time, what were 
you doing when you first observed the vehicle that 
you stopped? 
A. Just sitting in the median watching the 
traffic. 
Q. Okay. Were you pointed and facing the 
direction that the car you stopped was traveling, 
so it was coming toward you? 
A. I was facing it as it was coming 
towards me. So I was facing west. The vehicle 
was eastbound. 
Q. Now, this emergency vehicle was a UDOT 
vehicle, right? 
A. Yes, several of them. 
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Q. Okay. Describe the scene of the UDOT 
vehicles. First of all, how far away were they 
from you? 
A. I would say maybe 20 feet down the road 
behind me. 
Q. East of your position? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And describe what you saw with the UDOT 
vehicles. What's going on there? 
A. Well, there were several that are UDOT 
pick-up trucks that are tjie white trucks with the 
orange or yellow lights on the top of them. There 
was--they had one of their loaders there, and it 
looked to me like they were repairing a sign, one 
of the big signs that, you know, tells you how far 
Denver and a couple other locations were. 










Were these orange or yellow lights on? 
Yes . 
Do you think it was on all the 
That I recall, yes. 
Okay. How about the workers? Were 
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Q. There's two vehicles, a semi and a 
passenger car. What do you see? Describe what you 
see ? 
A. I observed both vehicles traveling in 
the outside lane, and they both appear to be 
picking up speed getting on the freeway. Neither 
vehicle moved over for the DOT units. Both passed 
them in that right lane. Both of them had ample 
opportunity to move over. 









There was none. 
Impeding their moving over? 
No. 
What about the speed? Were they slowing 
Did not appear to be, no. 
In your opinion, could they have moved 
over? 
A. Oh, definitely. 
Q. Do you recall them moving over to at 
least the center line and crowding the center line? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you note any evasive action taken by 
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the driver of the car? 
A. No. 
Q. In your opinion, should they have moved 
over? 
A. I think they should have. 
Q. Did you feel like it was unsafe? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you immediately initiate a stop? 
A. Yes. As soon as I caught up to the 
passenger vehicle, I did initiate a stop. 
Q. Okay, and did they pull over 
immediately? 
A. That I recall, yes. I don't remember 
any long delay. 
Q. Okay. Now, at the preliminary hearing, 
you indicated several things that caught your 
attention. The first, excessive luggage in the 
vehicle ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What kind of vehicle is this? 
A. It's a Chevy HHR. 
Q. What kind of vehicle is that? 
A. It's Chevy's model of a PT Cruiser. It 
kind of looks like ah SUV, just smaller. 
Q. Does it have a trunk? 
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asks to do that, and that kind of furthered my 
suspicion that they wanted me away from the 
vehicle. By him stepping out, I have to move away 
from the vehicle to keep, you know, a safe 
distance-
Q. Did he go to the trunk or the back 
portion to get his license? 
A. No, he did not, 
Q. Okay, Did you obtain identification 
from both occupants? 
A. Yes, I did, j 
Q. What did you notice about that? 
A. I noticed that they were from pretty 
different areas. The driver, Ms, Flynn, provided 
me with a Michigan identification card. Mr. Juma 
provided me with a Kansas driver's license. 
Q. What about the vehicle? Where was it 
registered out of? 
A. Nebraska. 
Q. And what's significant about these 
people being from different areas of the country? 
A. I found that it's common for drug 
traffickers to have multiple locations involved 
with the situation. They will grab a driver from 
here, a passenger from here, a car from here. 
•i-^sssamm 
ILP THACKER*CO 
I Willi C O U R T R E P O R T E R S ^ • I 1 C 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
801-983-2180 Toll Free: 877-441-2180 Fax: 801-983-2181 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.


























Q. Was there any question in your mind that 
the dog had indicated? 
A. No. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. It was a good indication, I kept 
moving. He went back to me. Throughout my 
training, I knew that he was in the overt 
narcotics, and the fact that he was scratching and 
barking is a very good indication. 
Q. So he was scratching and barking, so 
that's two kinds of indications. 
A. Yes. 
Q. The only other one would be biting? 
A. Yes, and technically, to be considered 
an indication, he only needs to do one of those. 
I mean, if all he had done is stood at that door 
and barked, I would have considered that an 
indication. If all he would have done is scratched 
at it, the same thing. 
Q. Alright. Officer, you have a recording 
device in your vehicle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it operating during this stop? 
A. Operating, all but the belt mike, yes. 
Q. The belt mike, that's the mike that 
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works outside the vehicle, outside your cruiser? 
A. Yes . 
And when is it activated? 
When I turn on my emergency lights. 
When is it deactivated? 
When I turn it off. v 
I'm going to show you as State's Exhibit 
What is that? 









Q. Okay, did you have that made? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I would like to offer Number 1. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY: No objection. 
THE COURT: Mr. Flint? 
MR. FLINT: No objection. 
THE COURT: You both agree. State's 
Exhibit 1 is received without objection. 
Q. Alright, I have nothing further. Thank 
you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Neeley? 
Mr. Flint? Whichever, I'm sorry.• 
MR. FLINT: Judge, I'll go first, if 
you don't mind. I'm going to ask the Court's 
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A. Yes . 
Q. You didn't observe any traffic 
violation? 
A. Not at that time, no. 
Q. Okay, and do you recall your previous 
testimony at the preliminary hearing when I asked 
you about the UDOT vehicles, is that correct? 
A. Yes, I remember you asking about that. 
Q. You say there were several UDOT 
vehicles? 
A. Yes.
 t ' 
Q. Were they parked on the pavement or on 
the gravel? 
A. As I testified before, there was one 
that was partially on the pavement. The rest of 
them were kind of off into the dirt. 
And they had their yellow lights 
Yes . 







Q. .None of them had a combination of red 
and white or red and blue lights flashing? 
A. I don't know of any that are equipped 
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have explained that discrepancy? 
A. No. I don't make it a point to provide 
each other's stories to them so that they can 
correct their story. I mean, it's pretty simple to 
me. One gives me one story, one gives me one 
totally different. I'm not going to go say hey, 
you need to change your story. He's telling 
something different. 
Q. I guess, Sergeant, without beating a 
dead horse, what I'm getting at here is if they had 
been actually traveling separately, both of their 
stories could be correct? 
A. If. 
Q. Okay. When you got the dispatch 
information ba.ck to verify that Mr. Juma had a 
valid license and no warrant so he could drive the 
car away, because that was your intent, correct? 
A. What's that? 
Q. Your intent was to let Mr. Juma drive 
the car away and give Ms. Flynn a warning? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And dispatch, in .fact, told you Mr. Juma 
did have a.valid driver's license? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that there were no warrants for his 
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Q. But you also obtained from dispatch, 
essentially, Mr. Juma's arrest record? 
A. Yes. 
Q, And that arrest record then added 
additional suspicion? 
A • Yes. 
Q. Okay, and then ultimately, you received 
word from dispatch that, in fact, the car was truly 
correctly rented to Mr. Jyma from an agency in 
Kansas, just like he said? 
A • Yes. 
Q. And it was due back? 
A, Yes• 
Q. Which would mean they would have a lot 
of driving ahead of them to get it back? 
A. Yes, they would, 
Q. They might even be late in getting it 
back and have to pay an extra day's rent? 
A. Probably. 
Q. Okay, but again, paying an extra day's 
rent is not all that unusual, is it, for traveling 
across country? 
A. I see it occasionally, yes. 
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Correc t . 
And you gave her the warning c i t a t i o n ? 
Cor rec t . 
And you said, this is just a warning? 
Yes . 
Okay, and she thanked you for giving her 
Yes, she did. 
Okay, and she opened the door? 
Yep. 
And she got out of the vehicle. 
Yes. 
And she was completely out of the 
vehicle and standing on the pavement ready to go 
get back in the car? 
A. I believe so, yes. 
Q. And at that point you said, hey, can I 
ask you some more questions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Or something to that effect? 
A. Something to that effect, yes. 
Q. Alright. In asking those questions, 
both she .and Mr. Juma denied having contraband, 
denied having weapons? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And both of them declined to consent to 
any search? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Alright, and then at that point in time, 
you deployed the dog? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And based upon the dog's indication, you 
conducted a search? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Now, once that dog gave you that 
indication, did you--both Mr. Juma and Ms. Flynn 
were outside of the vehicle, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And they were far enough away from the 
vehicle that they couldn't have destroyed or hidden 
any evidence? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Okay, and you could have had back-up 
there to contain them or detain them? You could 
have radioed in and requested that the process 
start to get a warrant? 
A. I could have I guess. 
Q. But you specifically chose not to seek a 
warrant? 
A. Yes. 
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41-6a-904. Approaching emergency vehicle — Necessary signals — Stationary 
emergency vehicle — Duties of respective operators. 
(1) Except when otherwise directed by a peace officer, the operator of a vehicle, upon 
the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle using audible or visual 
signals under Section 41-6a-212 or 41-6a-1625, shall: 
(a) yield the right-of-way and immediately move to a position parallel to, and as close 
as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, clear of any intersection; and 
(b) then stop and remain stopped until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed. 
(2) The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary authorized emergency 
vehicle that is displaying alternately flashing red, red and white, or red and blue lights, 
shall: 
(a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; 
(b) provide as much space as practical to the stationary authorized emergency vehicle; 
and 
(c) if traveling in a lane adjacent to the stationary authorized emergency vehicle and if 
practical, with due regard to safety and traffic conditions, make a lane change into a lane 
not adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle. 
(3) The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary tow truck or highway 
maintenance vehicle that is displaying flashing amber lights, shall: 
(a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; and 
(b) provide as much space as practical to. the stationary tow truck or highway 
maintenance vehicle. 
(4) This section does not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, tow 
truck, or highway maintenance vehicle from the duty to drive with regard for the safety of 
all persons using the highway. 
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58-37-8. Prohibited acts ~ Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, 
or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of 
any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37e, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37,37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with 
five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, 
supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled 
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is 
guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree 
- felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may 
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of 
fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his 
person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, 
the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1 )(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree 
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and 
which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B » Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance 
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, 
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or 
as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
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77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
96 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78A-3-102, Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law 
certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, 
and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a j udgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final 
judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions 
of the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United 
States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States 
or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree 
felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative 
subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over 
which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of 
record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of 
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certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
review 
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue 
all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other 
local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not 
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of 
the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and 
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction, 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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